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I. Introduction
A frequently discussed tax reform suggestion of the last decade
is the integration of the federal income taxes imposed on corporations and shareholders.' Although various methods of achieving integration have been advanced, the common goal of the advocates of
integration is to eliminate, either wholly or in part, the double taxation of corporate earnings.2 Under present law, corporate income is
taxed when earned by the corporation and again when distributed as
a dividend to the shareholders.' This double taxation presumably
impedes capital formation.4 In light of recent economic trends in the
United States,5 double taxation has come under attack by many
commentators. 6
Despite the attention given to the impact of integration at the
federal level, very few commentators have focused on the effect of
integration on state income taxation of corporations and individu1. See C. McLURE, MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TWICE? (Brookings, Wash.
D.C. 1979); Break, Integrationof the Corporation and Personal Income Taxes, 22 NAT'L TAX J.
39 (1969); Break & Pechman, Reflections on "Integration"of CorporationandIndividualIncome
Taxes: Relationship Between the Corporation and Individual Income Taxes, 28 NAT'L TAX J.
341 (1975); Byrne & Sato, The Domestic Consequences ofAlternative Systems ofCorporate Taxation, 4 PuB. FINANCE Q. 259 (1976); Comm'n on Corporations of the Tax Section of the N.Y.
St. Bar A., Report on tke Integration of Corporateand IndividualIncome Taxes, 31 TAX LAW.
37 (1977); Cox, Corporate Income Tax and Integration: A Summary ofPositionsand the Prospectsfor Change, 58 TAXES 10 (1980); Feldstein & Frisch, Corporate Tax Integration: The
Estimated Effects on Capital Accumulation and Tax Distribution of Two Integration Proposals,
30 NAT'L TAX J. 37 (1977); Gabinet & Coffey, The Implications of the Economic Concept of
Incomefor Corporation-Shareholder Income Tax Systems, 27 CASE W. L. REV. 895 (1977);
Galvin, The Substantive Tax Reform Project: Preliminary Finiings on the Corporate Tax, 22
Sw. L.J. 717 (1968); Holland, Reflections on "Integration" ofCorporateand IndividualIncome
Taxes. Some Observations on Full Integration, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 353 (1975); McLure, Integration fthe Income Taxes: Why and How, 2 J. CORP. TAX. 429 (1976); McLure, Integration of
Personal and Corporate Income Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals,
88 HARV. L. REV. 532 (1975); McLure, The Taxation ofIncomefrom Corporate ShareholdingThe Casefor Integrating the Income Taxes, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 257 (1975); McLure & Surrey,
Integration of Income Taxes. Issuesfor Debate, 55 HARV. Bus. REv. 169 (1977); Surrey, Reflections on "Integration"of Corporation and Individual Income Taxes, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 335
(1975). Income tax integration is not an idea of the last decade. See, e.g., NAT'L TAX A.,
PROC. OF FORTIETH ANN. CONT. 134-89 (1947); Devine, Taxing Corporations as Partnershps,
26 TAXES 506 (1948); Westfall, Integrating Federal Income Taxes on Corporations and Their
Shareholders, 27 TAXES 236 (1949).
2. See, e.g., C. MCLURE, MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TWICE?, supra note 1;
Holland, supra note 1; McLure, Integration afthe Income Taxes. Why and How, supra note 1;
McLure, Integration ofPersonaland Corporate Income Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent
Tax Reform Proposals, supra note 1.
3. I.R.C. §§ 11, 61(a)(6). Double taxation presently is offset by the $100 dividend exclusion for individuals and 85% deduction for dividends received by corporations. Id §§ 116,
243-47. The earnings of certain corporations presently are taxed only once. See notes 90-132
and accompanying text infra
4. See, e.g., Harris, Tax Equity and the Needfor Capital With Special Reference to
Incomefrom Corporate Shareholding 28 NAT'L TAX J. 292 (1975); Hickman, Tax Equity and
the Needfor Capital, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 282, 287-88 (1975).
5. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT ON TAX POLICY AND CAPITAL FORMATION 3-4 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION].

6.

See note 2 supra,

8
als.7 Most states have not conducted major studies of the topic.
This article concentrates on the effect of integration at the state
level.9
Federal income tax integration has found recent support in

Congress' and in the Reagan administration." Although it is difficult to predict whether integration will become a reality in the near

future, 12 an analysis of the effect of integration on state income taxation provides additional factors that should be considered when inte-

gration is given serious attention by Congress and the public. 3
It is not certain when consideration of the effect of federal integration on state income taxation will move into the foreground, but a
related proposal deserves attention at the present time. The Ameri-

can Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) is studying a
proposal to extend the small business corporation provisions of Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code' 4 to all corporations that are

privately owned.' 5 This proposal, which in effect is similar to full
integration,' 6 would increase the number of Subchapter S corporations to the extent that states would need to reexamine their present
treatment of Subchapter S corporations. 7 The portions of this article that discuss full integration are pertinent to determining the ef7. Clarke, The Taxation ofIncomefram CorporateShareholding.: State and Local View,
28 NAT'L TAX J. 373 (1975); Comm'n on Corporations of the Tax Section of the N.Y. St. Bar
A., supra note 1, at 62-63; McKessy, Corporateand Individual Tax Reform Consideredfrom a
State and Local Viewpoint, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 377 (1975).
8. New York is a notable exception. Its Department of Taxation and Finance has undertaken a thorough study of the effect of income tax integration on New York. Letter from
James H. Tully, Jr., Commissioner of Taxation and Finance, State of New York, to James E.
Maule (January 11, 1978) (on file at the Dickinson School of Law).
9. Professor Charles McLure, the leading authority and author of numerous articles and
the only book on the topic of income tax integration, told the author of this article in 1978 that
neither he nor anyone he knew was studying the effects of federal income tax integration on
state income tax systems. The absence of any recent publications on the subject has confirmed
Professor McLure's observation.
10. See, e.g., H.R. 897, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (Rep. Beard); H.R. 306, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1981) (Rep. Hansen); H.R. 4833, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (Rep. Sawyer); 124
CONG. REC. H 640-42 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Ullman).
11. See, e.g., [1981] FED. TAXES (P-H) 60-165, 60-167 (Feb. 11, 1981) (remarks of Norman B. Ture, Undersecretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy).
12. See Cox, supra note 1, for a brief analysis of the political atmosphere in which decisions about federal income tax integration must be made.
13. The states anticipate that Congress will consider the effect of integration on their
income tax systems when it considers integration at the federal level. See Clarke, supra note 7,
at 376; McKessy, supra note 7, at 381.
14. I.R.C. §§ 1371-1379.
15. See 145 J. Accountancy, Jan. 1978, at 3. A similar study has been conducted by the
Small Business Administration Office of Advocacy. See 144 J. Accountancy, Oct. 1977, at 24.
The request for expansion and reform of Subchapter S also has been made in the commentary.
See Peckron, SubchapterS ShareholderRequirement. Needfor a Change, 55 TAXES 92, 95-96
(1977). Most, if not all, of the proponents of Subchapter S reform seek an increase in its use;
accordingly, comments in this section about the AICPA proposal apply to all Subchapter S
proposals.
16. Full integration is outlined in notes 21-25 and accompanying text infra.
17. Generally, states are divided on their recognition of elections by shareholders of Subchapter S corporations. See notes 90-99, 521-31 and accompanying text infra

fects of the AICPA proposal on states,' 8 since the two proposals
differ only in technical aspects 19 and quantitative impact.2 °

This article discusses several major methods of integration, historical aspects of integration, and some provisions in existing federal
and foreign tax law that are analogous to integration. The article
then analyzes the effects of integration on the states and the possible
state responses to the various methods of integration. The analysis
considers the state both as a separate entity and as a member of the
federal union and examines devices to preserve state income tax revenues that might otherwise be reduced by the adoption of integration
at the federal level.
II.

Preliminary Explanations

A.

Major Methods of Integration

1. Full Integration.- The basic premise of the full integration
method is that the shareholders of a corporation include their proportionate shares2' of the net income 22 of the corporation in gross
18.

For the purpose of simplicity, the remainder of this article does not specifically ad-

dress the AICPA or similar proposals. Nevertheless, comments made with regard to the full
integration proposal should be useful in determining the effects of the AICPA or similar Subchapter S revision proposals on state income taxation.
19. The differences between Subchapter S provisions and the full integration proposal
are of such relatively minor importance that the analysis of one proposal is quite relevant to
examination of the other proposal. For example, Subchapter S Corporations are taxed on
certain capital gains, I.R.C. § 1378, whereas under full integration these gains are subject to
tax at the shareholder level.
20. Full integration would affect all corporations; the AICPA or similar proposals would
affect only privately owned corporations.
21. For the purpose of simplicity, this article assumes that owners of common stock
would be taxed on amounts of corporate net income in proportion to their voting interests in
the corporation. Income tax integration at the federal level raises the issue of how to treat
owners of preferred stock and hybrid securities. See McLure, Integration ofPersonaland Corporate Income Taxes- The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals,supra note 1, at

563-64, 588. Although the resolution of these issues affects the identity of the shareholders
who are taxed and changes the distribution of the corporate net income, the concepts developed in this article are not significantly affected by the resolution of those issues. Although in
certain circumstances one resolution of those issues might have the effect of attributing more of
the distributive net income to nonresident shareholders than would another resolution, these
differences are ignored in this article because the differences are relatively insignificant, and
because this article assumes that any state that adopts integration will conform to the Federal
resolutions of these issues.
Another group of issues at the federal level concerns the treatment of part-year shareholders and shareholders who during the year change the amount of their holdings of stock in the
corporation. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIc TAx REFORM 71-73
(1977) [hereinafter cited as BLUEPRINTS]. Although there are various methods of resolving
these problems, this article assumes unchanging full year ownership of stock by shareholders
in corporations.
22. Under the full integration method, there are unresolved questions concerning the
manner in which corporate income is included by shareholders in gross income. One option is
to treat the shareholders as shareholders in Subchapter S corporations are treated. See I.R.C.
§§ 1371-1379. Another option is to treat the corporation as a conduit in much the same manner as a partnership. See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 21, at 68. See generally Cohen, Problems
Involved in Alternative Proposals/orIntegrationor Reduction in IS. Tax. Possible Solutionsto
PracticalProblems, 28 NAT'L TAx J. 359-60 (1975); McLure, Integrationof Personaland Cor-

income.23 Under the full integration method, it is immaterial
whether the net income of the corporation is actually distributed to
the shareholders.
One variation of the full integration method embellishes the basic proposal with a provision for withholding. The corporation is
required to withhold and remit to the government a certain portion
of its net income.24 The shareholders of the corporation claim their
proportionate shares of the tax withheld by the corporation as a
25
credit against their income tax liabilities.
2. Dividend Credit.-Under the dividend credit method,
shareholders receiving dividends from a corporation claim as a
credit against their income tax liabilities their proportionate shares
of the income tax paid by the corporation on the corporate net income 26 out of which the dividends are paid. 27 An essential feature of
the dividend credit method is the retention of the corporate income
tax. A second feature is that shareholders include the credit in gross
income.28
There are numerous variations of the dividend credit method of
porate Income Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals,supra note 1, at
563. This article assumes that any state that adopts integration will conform to the federal
treatment of the corporate net income, with minor deviations to account for the state income
exemption of interest on federal indebtedness and similar items.
23. BLUEPRINTS, supra note 21, at 68-75; Byrne & Sato, supra note 1, at 260, Comm. on
Corporations of the Tax Section of the N.Y. St. Bar A., supra note 1, at 38; STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 5, at 13; McKessy, supra note 7, at 378. Shareholders that
are corporations presumably would pay no income tax, but their shares of the corporate net
income would be included in their own net incomes and in the gross incomes of their
shareholders.
24. Comm. on Corporations of the Tax Section of the N.Y. St. Bar A., supra note 1, at 38.
Payment of this portion of the corporate net income to the government does not reduce the
amount included in the gross incomes of the shareholders. It is designed as a device to alleviate liquidity problems of the shareholders. BLUEPRINTS, supra note 21, at 73.
25. See note 23 supra, Taxes withheld with respect to a shareholder that is a corporation
presumably are claimed as credits by the shareholders of that corporation.
26. See note 22 supra. Several complicated issues must be resolved before the dividend
credit method of integration is adopted at the federal level. For example, the credit might be
denied for dividends distributed from tax-exempt income. This approach requires tracing the
corporate income, an approach not necessarily preferred by the architects of the dividend
credit method of integration. See Gourevitch, Corporate Tax Integration: The European Experience, 31 TAX LAW. 65, 95-96 (1977). Another approach, for example, is to require the corporation to pay tax on all income distributed as dividends. Id at 95.
27. Byrne & Sato, supra note 1, at 260; Comm. on Corporations of the Tax Section of the
N.Y. St. Bar A., supra note 1, at 37-38; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 5, at
11; McKessy, supra note 7, at 379. The section 116 individual dividend exclusion and section
243 corporate dividends received deduction probably would be repealed.
28. An example of this "gross-up" is as follows. Assume that .4 is a 5% shareholder of
Corporation X. In 1979, X has taxable income of $10,000 and pays corporate income tax of
$4,800 (A 48% corporate rate is assumed for purposes of simplicity). X distributes a $200
dividend to A. A must include $385 in gross income-$200 dividend plus $185, the income tax
paid by the corporation with respect to the $385 out of which it paid the $200. After computing his income tax liability, A claims a $185 credit. Cf. I.R.C. § 78, which requires a similar
gross-up by corporations that claim the deemed-paid foreign tax credit under sections 902 or
960.

integration. The credit allowed to the shareholder can vary from 100
percent of the tax paid by the corporation to as little as a fraction of
a percent of the tax.29
3. Dividend Deduction.-Another method of achieving integration is to allow corporations a deduction for dividends paid.30
This method has no effect on the computation of taxable income by
shareholders, although it might include repeal of the dividend exclusion for individuals 3 ' and the dividends received deduction for
shareholders that are corporations.32
4. DividendExclusion.-Integration can also be accomplished
by permitting shareholders to exclude dividends from gross income. 33 This method has a minimal effect on corporations that are
shareholders because these corporations presently deduct most divigross income. 34 There is no effect on the corporate indends from
35
come tax.
5. Split Corporate Tax Rates.-The basic premise of the splitrate method of integration is that the corporation pays tax on taxable
income that is distributed as dividends at a lower rate than on taxable income that is retained. 36 Countless pairs of split-rates can be
adopted, 37 but the important feature of this method is that the basic
structures of both corporate 38 and individual income tax remain
unchanged.
6. Repeal of CorporateIncome Tax.-The final method of integration examined by this article is the repeal of the corporate income tax. 39 Shareholders that are not corporations would continue
to include dividends in gross income.'
29. The concepts used in this analysis will not be affected by a change in the credit rate.
30. Comm. on Corporations of the Tax Section of the N.Y. St. Bar A., supra note 1, at 38;
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 5, at 14; McKessy, supra note 7, at 380.
31. I.R.C. § 116.
32. Id §§ 243-247.
33. McKessy, supra note 7, at 379.
34. See note 3 supra
35. To be more precise, there is a slight effect on the corporate income tax because the
85% dividends received deduction under section 243 is converted into a 100% dividend
exclusion.
36. Byrne & Sato, supra note 1, at 260; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note

5, at 17.
37. Technically, the dividend deduction method of integration is any form of the splitrate method under which the tax rate on distributed taxable income is zero.
38. The 85% dividends received deduction for corporations under sections 243-247 might
be repealed.
39. McKessy, supra note 7, at 379.
40. The $100 dividend exclusion for individuals under section 116 might be repealed.

B. HistoricalHighlights
1. The Split-Rate Experiment of 1936-38.-Corporateand individual income taxes were integrated during only one brief period

in the history of the federal income tax. In 1936, Congress imposed
a surtax on corporate taxable income that was not distributed as dividends.4" Taxable income distributed as dividends was taxed at the

normal corporate income tax rates. 42 This split-rate method of integration differs from the one previously described because the surtax
rates of 1936 varied according to the percentage of taxable income
distributed as dividends.4 3

During this period of integration, corporate dividend distributions increased substantially.' At the same time, many corporations
increased their tax deductible expenditures to avoid the surtax on
undistributed taxable income without increasing dividend distributions.45 In 1938, Congress repealed the surtax on undistributed taxable income.'
The effect of split-rate integration on the states during this period is inconclusive. Meaningful statistics are scarce 47 and, in addition, both corporate and individual state income taxes were less
significant than they are today.4s Nevertheless, two principal effects
on the state income taxes were notable. First, the increase in dividend distributions increased the income tax bases of the states that
had individual income taxes.49 Second, the increase in corporate ex-

penditures 50 reduced the taxable incomes of corporations subject to
state income taxation. 5'
41. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 14, 40 Stat. 1648.
42. Id § 13.
43. Id § 14.
44.

STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 5, at 17.

45. For example, employee compensation and maintenance expenses. Id
46. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 27, 52 Stat. 447.
47. The best statistics available are not sufficiently detailed to permit precise analysis.
48. In 1936, state income tax revenues from corporations were $113 million. Revenues
from individuals were $153 million. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF
THE UNITED STATES 1789-1945, at 317 (1949). In 1978, these amounts were $10.7 billion and
$29.1 billion, respectively. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 292 (101st ed. 1980). Between 1969 and 1979 state tax revenues increased 160%. Revenues from corporate income tax increased 225%. U.S. BuR.Au OF CENSUS, GOVERNMENTAL
FINANCES in 1978-79, Table 4 (1980); U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, GOVERNMENTAL FINANCES
in 1969-70, Table 4 (1971). It should be noted that fiscal year 1980 was the eighth consecutive
year in which state corporate and individual income tax revenues generated more tax revenue
($50.4 billion) than any other single source. 42 STATE TAX REV. (CCH), No. 10 (March 10,
1981).
49. This occurred whether or not the individual income tax system of the state conformed to the federal system, unless the state excluded dividends from income taxation.
50.

See text accompanying note 45 supra.

51. There may have been secondary effects. For example, the corporate executive who
received higher compensation and the business firm that performed maintenance services for
the corporation had an increase in income, which in many cases was subject to state income
taxation. The principal effects probably offset each other to a great extent.

2 The Massachusetts Property Tax.-Little history of corporate-shareholder integration in the United States exists, but the experience of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts with integrated

property taxes between 1813 and 1920 offers some interesting insights into the problem. Predictions based on the Massachusetts experience are limited, however, to the possible effects of an integrated

system of taxation on state tax administration. Study of the Massachusetts experience is not helpful in determining other possible
ef2
fects of the various methods of integration on the states.-

From the earliest days of its history as a colony and a state,
Massachusetts imposed a faculties tax on individuals and corporations.5 3 Each individual and corporation was required to submit a
general schedule of property that was owned. The schedule included

earned and unearned income derived from that property.5 4 Since
undistributed income of a corporation is reflected in the value of its

net assets, 55 the corporation in effect paid a property tax on undistributed income because it paid a property tax on its net assets. At
the same time, individual shareholders paid property taxes on the
value of stock they owned in the corporation. The value of the stock
also reflected the net asset value of the corporation. 6 Under this

property tax structure, the undistributed income of the corporation
was taxed twice. 57
The Massachusetts system of taxation was changed in 1813. In
a case challenging the double taxation of undistributed income, the

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a corporation was
required to include only real estate in its general schedule of property.58 This decision had a significant effect on Massachusetts reve52. There are issues concerning revenue effects, state legislative decisions to adopt or
reject integration, interrelationships among the states, and constitutional problems. For an
explanation of why the double taxation eliminated by the integrated property tax differs from
the double taxation of corporate income distributed as dividends, see note 57 and accompanying text infra.
53. Clarke, supra note 7, at 374.
54. Id
55. As a general rule, if a corporation earns income that is not distributed, it either
reduces liabilities or increases assets. If it reduces liabilities, its net asset value (assets less
liabilities) increases. See J. WESTON & E. B iuH.AM, MANAGERIAL FINANCE 89-92 (3d ed.
1969).
56. The stock of a corporation generally increases in value as its net asset value increases.
See id at 419-30.
57. See Clarke, supra note 7, at 374. The effect of the property tax can be more clearly
understood if it is assumed that the corporation distributes all its income. Because the net
assets of the corporation do not increase, it pays no property tax on the income. The property
of the shareholders who receive the dividends increases, assuming that it is not spent on disposable consumer goods. However, the increase in the value of their corporate stock that
would occur if the corporate income were not distributed does not occur. The property of the
shareholders, and their property tax liabilities, are, as a general proposition, the same as they
would be if the corporate income were not distributed. This double taxation differs from that
sought to be eliminated under the various income tax integration proposals because it is

double taxation of undistributed corporate income rather than of distributed corporate income.
58.

Salem Iron Co. v. Danvers, 10 Mass. 514 (1813).

nues and its enforcement of the property tax. Shareholders failed to
disclose stock ownership, 59 and the stock of nonresident shareholders
of Massachusetts corporations was not taxed since the property tax
was imposed only on property in Massachusetts.6' Finally, since the
tax was imposed at the local level, manufacturing towns that were
required to provide municipal services to corporations were in a less
advantageous position than residential towns with smaller municipal
burdens.6 '

In 1863, Massachusetts replaced the local property tax system
with a corporate property tax that was administered and collected by
the state.62 Finally, in 1916, Massachusetts closed an era in its tax
history by enacting a general individual income tax to replace the
state property tax system.63 This article will examine the experience
of the Massachusetts tax administrators during this era to determine
its significance for recent income tax integration proposals.
C

Current State Treatment of Analogous Situations.

L Partnershios.- State taxation of partnerships and their partners is especially useful for analyzing the effects of full integration
on state income taxation of corporations and their shareholders. The

residency of the partner as well as the place where the partnership
does business determines the income tax treatment of partners by a

particular state. To avoid generalizations that hamper proper analysis, the tax systems of five states will be discussed.

In Illinois, any resident who is a partner in a partnership, regardless of where it does business, must include his distributive share

of the net income of the partnership" in taxable income.6 If the
resident partner is taxed by another state on all or a portion of his
distributive share of the net income of the partnership, the partner
can claim a credit for income taxes paid to that state.6 6

A person who is a nonresident of Illinois and a partner in a
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Clarke, supra note 7, at 375.
Id at 374.
Id at 374-75.
Id at 375.
1916 Mass. Acts ch. 289. For an explanation of the reasons for changing to a general

income tax, see generally Williamson, Tax Legirlation During 1916, PROc. OF TENTH ANN.
CONF. OF NAT'L TAX A. 386, 394-96 (1917). The corporate franchise tax measured by net

income was revised in 1919. 1919 Mass. Acts ch. 355.
64. The net income of the partnership is determined as it is for federal income tax purposes. Illinois Income Tax Act § 205(b), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-205(b) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1981-82).
65. Illinois residents compute Illinois taxable income by making certain modifications to
their federal adjusted gross incomes. Id §§ 203(a)(1), 301. Technically, the distributive share
of partnership net income is included in Illinois taxable income because it is included in Illinois base income, a step in the computation. See id
66. The credit is claimed in accordance with the usual requirements for claiming a credit.
These requirements include adequate proof of payment of taxes to the other state, inclusion of
the income in Illinois taxable income, and foregoing any deduction for the taxes claimed as a

partnership that earns any income in Illinois must take several steps
to determine the amount of income subject to taxation by Illinois.
Nonbusiness income of the partnership is allocated to each partner
in proportion to his distributive share of the net income of the partnership.67 Each partner treats the allocated portion as if it were
earned in his separate capacity as an individual. 68 Thus, for example, the Illinois taxable income of a nonresident partner includes
capital gains from the sale or exchange of real proterty located in
Illinois, capital gains from the sale or exchange of personal property
having its situs in Illinois, capital gains from the sale or exchange of
personal property having its situs in a state that does not tax the gain
if the commercial domicile of the partner is in Illinois, and rents
from real property located in Illinois. 69 Business income of the partnership is allocated at the partnership level.70 If the partnership derives its business income solely from Illinois, the entire business
income is allocated to Illinois.7 Otherwise, business income is allocated pursuant to a conventional three-factor formula that measures
property, payroll, and sales.72 The business income attributable to
Illinois is then allocated to each partner in proportion
to his distribu73
tive share of the net income of the partnership.
New York taxes resident partners in virtually the same manner
as Illinois taxes resident partners. 4 The New York adjusted gross
income 75 of nonresident partners includes the portion of their distributive shares of partnership income that is derived from or connected with New York sources.76 Partnerships doing business in
New York77 are subject to the unincorporated business tax,78 which
is based on federal adjusted gross income.79
Ohio taxes partners in virtually the same manner as Illinois
credit. See Illinois Dep't of Revenue, Instructions to the 1976 Illinois Income Tax Form IL1040, at 6.
67. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 3-305(b) (Smith-Hurd 1981-82).
68. Id
69. Id § 303, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 3-303 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-82).
70. Id § 305(a).
71. Id §304(a).
72. Id
73. Id § 305(a).
74. N.Y. TAX LAW ch. 60, §§ 601(b), 617, 620(a) (McKinney Supp. 1979-80).
75. New York adjusted gross income is based on federal adjusted gross income and is the
amount from which New York taxable income is computed. Id § 63 1.
76. Id § 637. The New York treatment of nonresident partners differs from that in Illi-

nois only in the mechanics of allocation and apportionment.
77. Certain other entities, but not corporations, also are subject to the unincorporated
business tax. Id § 701(a).
78. The purpose of the unincorporated business tax is to prevent businesses from avoiding the corporate income tax by doing business in an unincorporated form. See Moffett v.
Bates, 276 App. Div. 38, a,'d without opinion, 301 N.Y. 597 (1949).
79. N.Y. TAX LAW ch. 60, § 705(a) (McKinney Supp. 1979-80).

taxes partners.8 0 Ohio, however, permits a partnership to file a single
return on behalf of, and pay the individual income tax liabilities of,
its nonresident partners if those partners derive no taxable income
from Ohio other than their distributive shares of the partnership's
net income allocable to Ohio.8 '

In Pennsylvania, residents who are partners in any partnership
include in their taxable income their distributive shares of each class
of income,82 but not classes of loss, 83 received by the partnership.84
If all or a portion of the partnership income is subject to income
taxation by another state, the partner can claim a credit for the
amount of income tax paid to the other state on income included by
the partner in taxable income.85 Nonresident partners of a partnership that derives all its income from sources within Pennsylvania are
subject to taxation by Pennsylvania on their entire distributive shares
of the net income of the partnership.86 Otherwise, the nonresident
partner is taxed on that portion of the distributive share derived
from sources within Pennsylvania plus the Pennsylvania share of income derived from sources not accurately ascertainable.87
Although there is no individual income tax in Florida, 88 corporations that are partners include their distributive shares of partnership net income in their Florida taxable income in much the same
manner as is done in Ohio and Illinois.89
2 Electing Small Business Corporations.- State income taxation of electing small business corporations9" under Subchapter S of
the Internal Revenue Code (Subchapter S corporations) illustrates
the divergent state legislative reactions to integration of corporation
and shareholder 9 ' taxation at the federal level. For federal income
80. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5747.01(A), 5747.05(A), 5747.05(B), 5747.20, 5747.21,
5747.22 (Page 1973 & Supp. 1980).
81. Id § 5747.08(D).
82. The classes of income are compensation, net profits from business, net gains from
disposition of property, rents and royalties, dividends, interest, gambling winnings, and net
gains or income from estates or trusts. 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7303 (Purdon Supp. 1981-

82).
83.
income.
84.
85.
86.

Losses are taken into account only to the extent they reduce gains in the same class of
Net losses in one class of income cannot reduce gains in another class. Id
Id § 7306.
Id § 7314.
Id § 7308.

87. Id § 7310. The results under the Pennsylvania income tax system are not unlike
those reached under Ohio and Illinois law, except for the nonrecognition of certain losses as
explained in note 83 supra.
88. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 5.
89. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 220.02(1), 220.12(1) (West Supp. 1981).
90. See I.R.C. §§ 1371-1379.
91. The federal tax treatment of Subchapter S corporations is not precisely full integration. See note 19 supra For examples of variations of state legislative reaction to the enactment of Subchapter S in addition to those described in this chapter, see notes 521-31 and
accompanying text infra

tax purposes, the shareholders of a Subchapter S corporation, not the
corporation, 92are generally taxable on the net income of the
corporation.
In New York, 93 Ohio, 9 4 and Pennsylvania,95 Subchapter S corporations are subject to taxation as any other corporations. New
York, however, requires resident shareholders of Subchapter S corporations to include their shares of undistributed corporate income
in gross income. 96 Nonresidents are not required to do so. 97
Illinois does not tax Subchapter S corporations.9 8 Florida taxes
only that portion of Subchapter S corporate income that is subject to
federal income tax. 99
3. Cooperatives.- State income tax treatment of the cooperative also deserves attention."°° For federal income tax purposes, cooperatives are permitted to deduct amounts paid as capital stock
dividends.'1 l This treatment of cooperatives is almost identical to
the dividend deduction method of integration. 102
Florida and Illinois specifically permit cooperatives to deduct
dividends paid to the same extent that the dividends may be deducted for federal income tax purposes. 0 3 No specific provisions exist in the tax laws of New York, Ohio, or Pennsylvania dealing with
cooperative dividend deductions, but the deduction is presumably
allowed because those states define taxable income as federal taxable
income and include no modifications of the dividend deductions by
cooperatives. "o
4. Domestic InternationalSales Corporations.- State income
05
tax treatment of domestic international sales corporations (DISC)
demonstrates the reactions of states to partial integration at the fed92. I.R.C. §§ 1371-1379.
93. N.Y. TAX LAW ch. 60, § 208(9) (McKinney 1966); Ruling of State Tax Commission,
November 17, 1958, 1 N.Y. STATE TAX REP. (CCH) $ 5-101.375.
94. OrIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.01(C) (Page 1973).
95. Letter from Department of Revenue, 106 Pitts. L.J. 52 (1958), 139 Legal Intelligencer
119 (1958), I PA. STATE TAX REP. (CCH)

10-101.70.

96. Opinion of Counsel, November 17, 1967, 1 N.Y. STATE TAX REP. (CCH) 1 5101.375.
97. N.Y. TAX LAW ch. 60, § 632(b)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
98. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-205(c) (Smith-Hurd 1974).
99. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220.13(2)(i) (West Supp. 1980).
100. I.R.C. § 1381.
101. Id § 1382(c)(1).
102. See notes 30-32 and accompanying text supra. However, patronage dividends are not
deductible. I.R.C. § 1382(b).
103. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220.13(2)(g) (West Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2203(d)(2)(F) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981).
104. N.Y. TAX LAW ch. 60, § 208(9) (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1981); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 5733.04(1) (Page 1973); 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7401(3) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
105. A DISC is defined in I.R.C. § 992(a) as, in effect, a domestic corporation whose receipts and assets are substantially related to export activities.

eral level. A DISC is not subject to federal income tax.I °6 Instead, a
portion of its net income, whether or not distributed, is included in
the income of its shareholders. 0 7 The remainder of the net income
is effectively untaxed. 10 8 For this reason, the federal income tax
treatment of a DISC is not full integration. Nevertheless, taxation of
DISCs sufficiently resembles full integration and is therefore relevant for analysis.
In Pennsylvania, a DISC is taxed in the same manner as other
corporations."°9 A DISC shareholder who is an individual and a resident of Pennsylvania is required to include in gross income all dividends actually received from the DISC." 0 The nonresident
individual shareholder of a DISC is not subject to Pennsylvania taxation on dividends actually received from the DISC."' A shareholder of a DISC that is a corporation subject to tax by Pennsylvania
includes its share of the net income of the DISC in Pennsylvania
gross income." 2 The corporation, however, is permitted to deduct
"dividends received from any other corporation but only to the extent that such dividends are included in [federal] taxable income." II
Presumably, although dividends deemed distributed to a shareholder
of a DISC for federal income tax purposes are not "received" by the
shareholder, the corporate shareholder of the DISC is permitted to
deduct its share of DISC income included in federal and, thus, Pennsylvania income.
In Ohio, the DISC is also subject to taxation in the same manner as other corporations." 4 The shareholder of the DISC includes
in Ohio taxable income that portion of the DISC's federal taxable
income allocable to Ohio, based on the assets of the DISC situate in
Ohio and elsewhere.'

15

In Florida,"16 Illinois,'

and New York,'

the DISC is exempt

106. I.R.C. § 991.
107. Id § 995. The calculation of the portion of the net income of the DISC that is included in the gross income of its shareholders is very complicated, but as a general rule it can
be as little as one-half, or as great as all of the net income of the DISC.
108. Id The income that is not taxed may be taxed in the future when and if the shareholder disposes of stock in the DISC, or when and if the DISC terminates existence as a DISC
or is disqualified as a DISC. Id § 995(b)(2), (c).
109. Letter from Director, Bureau of Corporation Taxes, to Commerce Clearing House,
Inc. (May 30, 1972), 1 PA. STATE TAX REP. (CCH)

10-101.10.

110. 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7303(a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
111. Id §§ 7302(b), 7308. See Pa. Dep't of Revenue, 1977 Pennsylvania Individual Income Tax Forms and Instructions at 11.
112.

72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7401(3) (Purdon Supp. 1981).

113. Id See note 127 and accompanying text infra for the interpretation given to this
language with respect to Subpart F income. The same reasoning should apply by analogy to
deemed dividends from a DISC.
114. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5733.01(D) (Page 1973).
115. Tax Commissioner's Special Instruction No. 12 (September 5, 1972), 1 OHIO STATE
TAX REP. (CCH) 110-305.30.
116. Since Florida taxable income is based on federal taxable income, a DISC has no
Florida taxable income. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220,12(1) (West Supp. 1981).
117. Illinois taxable income also is based on federal taxable income. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
120, § 2-203(b)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981).
118. N.Y. TAX LAW ch. 60, § 208(9)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
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from taxation. In Florida, individual shareholders of a DISC are not
subject to income tax."19 Individual shareholders in Illinois and
New York and corporate shareholders in all three states are taxed on

the properly allocable portion of the DISC's federal taxable income. 20 In New York, any corporation subject to New York taxaa DISC must file a consolidated income
tion that is a shareholder in
12 1
DISC.
the
with
tax return
5. ControlledForeign Corporations.-For purposes of analyzing state legislative reaction to federal income tax provisions resem-

bling integration, controlled foreign corporations (CFC)

22

are

23

Genertreated similar to DISCs for federal income tax purposes.
24 include a portion of the net income of the CFC
ally, shareholders
remainder of the
in federal taxable income (Subpart F income); the 25

net income is, in effect, deferred for tax purposes.
Florida and Ohio specifically exclude Subpart F income from

taxable income.' 26 In Pennsylvania, Subpart F income is excluded
pursuant to Commonwealth v. Emhart Corp. 127 Subpart F income is
included in Illinois and New York taxable income.' 28 Both states

provide, however, that foreign taxes on Subpart F income, which
shareholders of CFCs must include in federal taxable income if they
claim a foreign tax credit 129 for federal taxes, 130 are excluded from
taxable income. '3' The CFC itself is taxed by a state if it32does business in the state and derives income from that activity.'
119. See note 88 and accompanying text supra
120. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220.12(1) (West Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 2203(b)(1), 3-301 (Smith-Hurd 1974 & Supp. 1981); N.Y. TAX LAW ch. 60, § 208(8-A) (b) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
121. N.Y. TAx LAW ch. 60, § 208(9)(i)(B) (McKinney Supp. 1980); N.Y. TAX REG. § 3-9.3(b), I N.Y. STATE TAX REP. (CCH) 9-626.
122. Controlled foreign corporations are defined in I.R.C. § 957 as, in effect, a foreign
corporation of which more than 50% of its shareholders are United States persons.
123. I.R.C. §§ 951-964. In contrast to a DISC, the CFC, and not its shareholders, is subject to tax on any income from sources within the United States that is effectively connected
with trade or business in the United States. Id §§ 882, 952(b).
124. This does not include foreign shareholders not subject to taxation by the United
States. Id §§ 951(b), 957(d).
125. See id §§ 882, 951. See also note 108 supra; I.R.C. §§ 367, 1248.
126. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220.13(3)(b)(2) (West Supp. 1981); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5733.04(I)(2) (Page 1973).
127. 443 Pa. 397, 278 A.2d 916 (1971), appeal dismissed,cert denied, 404 U.S. 981 (1972).
See notes 109-13 and accompanying text supra.
128. See note 117 supra, The law in New York is similar to the law in Illinois on this
issue. N.Y. TAX LAW ch. 60, § 208(9) (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1980).
129. I.R.C. §§ 901, 902, 960.
130. Id § 78. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
131. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-203(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); N.Y. TAX LAW ch.
60, § 208(9)(a)(6) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
132. Since the net income of a corporation, for purposes of the income tax laws of the five
states discussed in this section, is based on federal taxable income, the income from that busi-

6. CorporationsFormed to A void Income Tax on Shareholders.-Certain federal income tax provisions remotely resemble integration because they require corporations, or shareholders under
certain conditions, to pay tax on certain undistributed taxable in34
come.' 3 3 These provisions address the accumulated earnings tax,
personal holding companies,' 35 and foreign personal holding companies.' 36 The corporation is permitted to deduct dividends paid to
shareholders when it computes the amount on which the accumulated earnings or personal holding company tax is imposed. ' 37 The
deduction for dividends paid is taken into account 138 in computing
the foreign personal holding company income required to be in139
cluded in the gross income of the shareholders.
The five state tax laws discussed in this section do not contain
provisions comparable to those in the federal tax law. I4I Because the
accumulated earnings tax and personal holding company tax are not
taxes on taxable income under section 11 of the Internal Revenue
Code,' 4 1 the amounts subject to those taxes are not included in the
taxable income of corporations, whether or not based on federal taxable income. In Pennsylvania, individuals do not include foreign
personal holding company income in gross income because no provision includes that income in one of the classes of income.1 42 Corporations in Pennsylvania can deduct the foreign personal holding
company income from taxable income 143 because that income is a
dividend to them. 44 The statutes of the other three states analyzed
in this section contain no provisions that exclude foreign personal
holding company income from the taxable income of individuals
45
based on federal taxable income.
D. Analogous Foreign Situations
L Canada.-A proposed but unadopted method of integrating
corporate and individual income taxes in Canada provides insights
into the problems that might be raised by integration in the United
ness activity generally is subject to federal and, thus, state income tax only if it is effectively
connected with the conduct of a trade or business in the United States. See I.R.C. § 882.
133. I.R.C. §§ 531-565.
134. Id §§ 531-537.
135. Id §§ 541-547.
136. Id §§ 551-558.
137. Id §§ 535(a), 545(a), 561-565.
138. To this extent, the foreign personal holding company provisions more closely resemble integration than do the accumulated earnings and personal holding company provisions.
139. I.R.C. § 556(a).
140. See, e.g., I ILL. STATE TAx REP. (CCH) 11-701.
141. I.R.C. §§ 531, 541(a).
142. See 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7303 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
143. Id § 7401(3).
144. See I.R.C. § 551(b); notes 109-13 and accompanying text supra

145. See note 140 and accompanying text supra

States. The relationship between the provinces and the national government of Canada is similar to the relationship between the various
states and the federal government in the United States.
In 1966, the Royal Commission on Taxation (Carter Commission) proposed the integration of corporate and individual income
taxes.' 4 6 Under the proposal, the corporation pays tax on its income 147 and shareholders include in income their share of the net
income of the corporation, whether or not distributed. 14 The tax
paid by the corporation on the share of the corporate income that is
included in the income of the shareholder is added to the income of
49
the shareholder. The shareholder then claims that tax as a credit. 1
The Ministry of Finance, which presented the proposal to the Parliament, 150 supported the proposal only as applied to closely held corporations. A modified proposal was reported favorably by the
House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs. 5 ' The Parliament, however, did not adopt the prothe impact of integration on the Canadian
posal' 52 because of
15
national economy.
One of the reasons that the Carter Commission integration proposal was rejected concerns the anticipated impact of integration on
the provinces. 5 4 According to the Carter Commission, an integration program that lacked coordination between the federal government and the provinces would be "unsatisfactory" and an
"administrative nightmare. '- 5 Nonetheless, the Commission proposed integration, and recommended only four methods to prevent
the problems that integration would pose to the provinces. First, the
Commission suggested that provinces not already participating
should permit the federal government to collect income taxes on behalf of the provinces, 156 as the "piggyback" provisions of the Internal
146.
147.

Royal Commission on Taxation, 4 Report 7 (Ottawa 1966).
Id

148.

Id

149. Id The proposal was a combination of full integration and a dividend credit method
of integration that can properly be labelled a distributive share credit method of integration.
150. E. Benson (Minister of Finance), Proposals for Tax Reform §§ 4.20, 4.34 (1969).
151. House of Commons Standing Comm. on Finance, Trade and Economic Affairs, 28th
Parl., 2d Sess., Report Respecting the White Paper on Tax Reform 42 (Comm. Print 1970).
152. See the discussion in Gourevitch, supra note 26, at 84-86.
153. Some of the reasons included a shift in the tax burden from the corporate income tax
to other taxes, the ignoring of the separate existence of corporations, and the creation of a rigid
federal tax system. See id at 85-86; Hammer, The Taxation of Income from Corporate Shareholding- Review ofPresentSystems in Canada,France,Germany, Japanandthe U.K, 28 NAT'L
TAX J. 315, 324-27 (1975).

154. See Standing Senate Comm. on Banking, Trade and Commerce, 28th Parl., 2d Sess.,
Report on the White Paper Proposals for Tax Reform Presented to the Senate of Canada 45
(Comm. Print 1970).

155. Royal Commission on Taxation, 6 Report 197 (Ottawa 1966).
156.

Id

at 195.

Revenue Code'. permit the United States to collect individual income taxes on behalf of qualifying states.'
Second, the Commission recommended that the provinces forego taxing corporations.' 5 9
Alternatively, it suggested that the federal government permit shareholders to take a credit against their federal tax liabilities for both
the federal tax on the corporation and a standard rate of provincial
corporation tax.16 ° Finally, the Commission recommended a highly
technical harmonization of corporate and individual federal and
provincial income tax rates and a continuation of the federal allowance for abatement of individual provincial income taxes.' 6 '
The Ministry of Finance modified in three respects the recom-

mendations of the Carter Commission concerning the impact of integration on the provinces. First, the Ministry proposed extensive
discussions on the matter between the federal government and the
provinces.' 62 Second, it stated that changes in the provincial tax law
would be required.' 63 Finally, it proposed the repeal of the federal
t64

allowance for abatement of individual provincial income taxes.

The Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade, and Commerce

reported that the provinces had "expressed their disagreement with
the introduction of" a "radical and complicated restructuring of the

tax system."'

65

The Committee stated that if several provinces re-

fused to harmonize their income tax systems with that of the federal
government, the result would be an "impenetrable
jungle of tax law
' 66
that would defy rational application."'
2. West Germany.-West Germany is the only nation with an
integrated corporate and individual income tax and a federal relationship between the states and the national government. The struc157. I.R.C. §§ 6361-6365.
158. Both the United States and Canadian federal "piggyback" provisions require that the
state or provincial income tax conform substantially to the federal income tax. Id § 6361(a);
Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act, 1960-61 CAN. STAT. ch. 58; Federal-Provincial
Fiscal Arrangements and Established Programs Financing Act, 1976-77 CAN. STAT. ch. 10, § 7
(1977).
159. Royal Commission on Taxation, 6 Report 195 (Ottawa 1966).
160. Id at 197. It should be pointed out that this suggestion may have been made in light
of the fact that only two provinces at that time had not agreed to piggyback collection of their
taxes by the federal government. Id at 190.
161. Id at 199.
162. E. Benson, supra note 150, at § 7.10.
163. Id §7.11.
164. Id § 7.12. The House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and
Economic Affairs merely stressed the importance of coordination between the federal government and the provinces. House of Commons Standing Comm. on Finance, Trade and Economics, supra note 151, at 45.
165. Standing Senate Comm. on Banking, Trade and Commerce, supra note 154, at 45.
166. Id If this prediction is applicable to the United States, it casts a dark cloud on the
future of income tax integration. In subsequent sections, this article explores whether the fears
of the Senate of Canada have meaning for the United States.

ture of income taxation in West Germany, however, makes analogy
to the United States and its individual states difficult.
Prior to 1977, West Germany had a split-rate method of integration167 that taxed undistributed corporate net income at fifty-one
percent and distributed income at fifteen percent.' 61 Since 1976,
West Germany has had a combination split-rate and dividend credit
method of integration. Undistributed corporate income is taxed at
fifty-six percent and distributed income is taxed at thirty-six percent. 16 9 Shareholders, however, are permitted to claim a credit for
the taxes paid by the corporation on the income distributed to
as a credit must be included in the income
them. 170 The tax claimed
17 1
of the shareholder.

The states of West Germany have a unique relationship with
the federal government in the area of income taxation. The states do
not have separate legislative powers to tax, but share the proceeds of
the basic corporate' 72 and individual taxes 1 73 with the federal government and municipalities.
Determination of the respective shares of the federal, state, and
municipal governments requires the consent of the Council of
States.' 74 Special formulas allocate the share of the states among the
states, and equalization procedures take into account the different
Because of this mechafinancial strengths of the various states.'
nism, which resembles revenue-sharing, income tax integration has
not created any significant problems for the states of West Germany.
III. The State in Isolation: The Effect of Income Tax Integration
A.

Introduction

Congressional integration of corporate and individual income
taxes will produce an immediate effect on the various states in the
absence of state legislative reaction. The extent of that immediate
effect depends on the method of integration adopted and the nature
of each particular state's system of taxation. 76 This section exam167. Hammer, supra note 153, at 317-18. For a description of the split-rate method of
integration, see notes 36-38 and accompanying text .pra
168. See Gourevitch, supra note 26, at 68-69; Hammer, supra note 153, at 317-18.
169. Id
170. Id
171. Id
172. HARvD LAw SCHOOL, WORLD TAX SERnEs: TAXATION IN THE FEDEa.
LIC OF GERmANY, ch. 1, § 3.2 (2d ed. H.J. Gumpel 1973).

REPuB-

173. There is a corporate income tax on undistributed net income. See note 169 and accompanying text spr174.

HARVAID

LAW SCHOOL, mpra note 172, at § 3.2.

175. Id
176. The nature of state taxing systems can be analyzed in terms of their conformity to the
federal income tax. Under this approach, states can be separated into the following six categories: (1) states with no income tax; (2) states with no individual income tax, but with a corpo-

ines various situations that might arise and develops an analysis of
the immediate effects on the states. 1'7 Two assumptions underlie the
analysis for each state: (1) the corporation is incorporated and does
all its business in that state 78 and (2) the shareholders of that corporation are residents 79 of that state.' 80
B.

Full Integration
States that require corporations to compute state taxable income

by making adjustments to federal taxable income' 8 ' will be signifirate income tax that confronts to the federal income tax; (3) states with an individual and
corporate income tax, neither of which conform to the federal income tax; (4) states with an
individual and corporate income tax, of which only the individual income tax conforms to the
federal income tax; (5) states with an individual and corporate income tax, of which only the
corporate income tax conforms to the federal income tax; and (6) states with an individual and
corporate income tax, both of which conform to the federal income tax.
This article focuses primarily on states in the second, fifth, and sixth categories. Of the
states in the first category, the adoption of income tax integration at the federal level will have
no effect other than to change income taxes that residents pay to other states from sources
within which they earn income. With respect to states in the third category, the effect is the
same as it is for states in the first category except that the state might review its decision not to
conform to the federal income tax. The analysis of the effect on states in the fourth category is
inversely analogous to the fifth category.
177. The next section discusses what reactions, if any, various state legislatures might take
in response to the enactment of income tax integration by the Congress. See notes 230-329 and
accompanying text infra. Subsequent sections embellish the analyses in this and the next section by taking into account the federal relationship .among the states. See notes 330-502 and
accompanying tex infra.
178. The purpose of this assumption is to prevent the hypothetical corporation discussed
in this section from being subject to income taxation by any other state. This permits the
analysis to begin at a less complex stage than it does in the subsequent sections in which it is
assumed at times that the corporation is subject to taxation by more than one state. See notes
357-502 and accompanying text infra The term "resident" when used in this article with respect to corporations means a corporation subject to income taxation by the state in which it is
a "resident."
179. States have different definitions of "resident." For example, Pennsylvania defines
resident as "an individual who is domiciled in [Pennsylvania] unless he maintains no permanent place of abode in [Pennsylvania] and does maintain a permanent place of abode elsewhere . . . or who is not domiciled in [Pennsylvania] but maintains a permanent place of
abode in [Pennsylvania]." 72 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 7 301(p) (Purdon Supp. 1977). In contrast, Ohio defines resident as "[a]n individual who is domiciled in (Ohio and an] individual
who.. . maintains a permanent place of abode in [Ohio], and who does not maintain a permanent place of abode elsewhere." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5747.01(I)(1), (2) (Page Supp.
1975). The term "resident" when used in this article with respect to individuals includes the
various concepts associated with the definition but it is assumed that in no event is an individual a resident of more than one state. This permits initial analysis to begin at a more fundamental stage. See note 178 supra In subsequent sections, portions of the analysis assume that
an individual is subject to taxation by more than one state, as a resident of one state and a
nonresident of another.
180. More complex situations, in which the corporation, the shareholder, or both, are subject to taxation in more than one state, are analyzed in subsequent sections of this article. See
notes 330-502 and accompanying text infra
181. The corporate income tax systems of the five states whose income tax systems are
examined in this section conform to the federal income tax system. As of December 16, 1980,
thirty-five of the forty-six states with corporate income taxes did likewise. 41 STATE TAx RV.
(CCH) No. 51, at 4-5 (December 16, 1980). In a few of these states, however, the conformity is
with respect to the Internal Revenue Code as of a specific date. See, e.g., Wallace v. Commissioner of Taxation, 289 Minn. 220, 184 N.W.2d 588 (1971) (Minnesota Constitution prohibits
federal amendments to Internal Revenue Code subsequent to date referentially adopted by
legislature from being applicable to Minnesota). This article assumes that state conformity to

cantly affected by adoption of full integration at the federal level.' 8 2
Under full integration, federal taxable income of corporations is
zero.' 83 Accordingly, the state taxable income of the corporation is
zero unless the corporation has items of income excluded from its
federal gross income or has taken deductions on its federal return for
which there are adjustments required by the state tax law. 1 84 For
example, a corporation must add municipal bond interest, state income taxes paid or accrued, and one-half of net long-term capital
gain to federal taxable income. 85 These adjustments, however, not
only offset each other to some extent,' 86 but also constitute a relatively minor fraction of state taxable income of corporations.' 8 7
experience a drastic decrease in corporate
Consequently, states will
188
income tax revenues.
Full integration at the federal level will have various effects on
state individual income taxation. In Pennsylvania, there will be no
effect'8 9 because individual taxable income is computed without rethe federal income tax base is so structured that amendments to the federal tax law are automatically adopted by the state.
182. The unincorporated business tax law in New York also is affected. See notes 78-79
and accompanying text supra
183. See notes 21-23 and accompanying textsupra. The corporation has a tax liability if it
is required to withhold taxes on behalf of the shareholders. This is the liability of a withholding agent, however, not income tax liability. See notes 24-25 and accompanying text supra
184. Most state corporate income tax laws contain at least several of these items. See note
185 and accompanying text infra.
185. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-203(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981). The language of the Illinois statute raises an interesting issue. The adjustments are required "to the
extent excluded [or deducted) from gross income in the computation of adjusted gross income." Id Initially, it might be argued that the adjustments required by the statute do not
exist because under full integration corporations do not compute adjusted gross income or
gross income. It is more likely, however, that under full integration corporations will continue
to compute gross and taxable incomes, in order to compute the distributive shares of corporate
net income included in the gross income of the shareholders. The mechanics probably will not
be unlike the partnership provisions of Subchapter K of Chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue
Code. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 701-703.
186. There are subtraction adjustments as well as the addition adjustments, some of which
are listed in the text accompanying note 185 supra. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2203(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981).
187. Complete and precise statistics are difficult to find, but it is possible to approximate
the situation. In 1977, the income of corporations subject to federal income tax was $212.5
billion. The amount of one important subtraction, interest from state and local obligations,
was only $8.3 billion. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, I.R.S., PRELIMINARY STATISTICS OF
INCOME-1977 CORPORATION INCOME TAX RETURNS, Pub. 159, at 3, 13 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as IRS 1977 CORPORATION INCOME TAX STATISTICS].
188. In 1979, the states raised $12.1 billion from corporate income tax revenues. Of that
amount, $8.3 billion was raised by states whose corporate income tax systems conformed to the
federal income tax system. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 305 (101st ed. 1980).
189. Pennsylvania requires individuals to include "dividends" in taxable income. 72 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7303(a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1981). The term "dividends", however, should
not encompass undistributed taxable income of a corporation included in the federal gross
income of the shareholder because the term will continue to have independent significance.
This conclusion is based on analogy to the partnershipprovisions of Subchapter K of Chapter
I of the Internal Revenue Code, in which distributions are distinguished from distributive
shares. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 736(b)(1).

gard to federal taxable income.' A significant effect, however, will
occur in states whose individual income tax base conforms to the
federal income tax base.'9 1 Since there are no provisions in the tax
laws of these states permitting the shareholder to deduct undistributed taxable income of the corporation from taxable income for purposes of computing state taxable income, revenues
from individual
92
income taxes in those states will increase.'
The combined effect of full integration at the federal level on
corporate and individual income taxes of the state varies according
to the facts and circumstances of each case.' 93 In Florida, where
there is no individual income tax, the combined effect will be an
almost complete elimination of income tax revenues.' 94 Similarly, in
Pennsylvania, where individual income tax revenues will be essentially uneffected, corporate income tax revenues will be virtually
eliminated. 9 Whether the combined effect will produce an increase
or decrease in state income tax revenues in the other states-Illinois,
Ohio, and New York-depends on the interplay of three factors.
First, the actual effect is contingent upon whether the average corporate income tax rate is higher or lower than the average individual
income tax rate. 196 For example, in Illinois corporations pay tax at a
flat rate of four percent of taxable income and individuals pay tax at
a flat rate of two and one-half percent. 97 Second, the corporate dividend rate 9 ' is of consequence because it affects the amount of cor190.

See 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§§

7302, 7303 (Purdon Supp. 1981).

191. The conformity can be a reference to federal taxable income, a reference to federal
adjusted gross income, or by reference to federal income tax liability. As of December 16,
1980, thirty-three of the forty-four states with individual income taxes had individual income
tax systems that conformed to the federal income tax system. 41 STATE TAX REV. (CCH) No.
51, at 6 (December 16, 1980). The analysis of this article generally is not affected by the
manner in which the state attains conformity to the federal income tax system. If in a particular case the manner of conformity is of significance, the author so indicates.
192. In 1979, the states raised $32.6 billion from individual income tax revenues. Of that
amount, $23.9 billion was raised by states whose individual income tax systems conformed to
the federal income tax system. U.S. BuRAu OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 305 (101st ed. 1980). In states that require income tax liability to be computed
as a percentage of federal income tax liability, the same result is reached because there is a
higher federal income tax liability on which to base state income tax liability.
193. These conclusions are based on an assumption that there are no interstate aspects to
each transaction. See notes 178-80 and accompanying text supra The complications raised by
considering these interstate aspects are discussed in subsequent sections of this article. See
notes 330-502 and accompanying text infra.
194. See notes 213-15 and accompanying text infra.
195. Unlike Florida, Pennsylvania will not lose virtually all its income tax revenues. It is
doubtful, however, whether that distinction would make the tax administrators of Pennsylvania less concerned than those of Florida.
196. The existence of progressive tax rate structures at the state level and the difficulty in
determining tax brackets of shareholders makes it extremely difficult to derive a more precise
estimate.
197. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-201(b) (Smith-Hurd 1974). The flat rates are required
by the Illinois Constitution. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 3(a).
198. The dividend rate is the percentage of corporate income after taxes distributed as
dividends.

porate income subject to double taxation at the state level. 199
Finally, the result is affected by the provision in most state tax laws
disallowing state income taxes as deductions in computing corporate
net income for state tax purposes" °° and by the state tax treatment of
federal income taxes.2 0 '
C.

Dividend Credit

The adoption of a dividend credit method of integration at the
federal level will affect state revenues from the corporate income tax
only slightly. Under the dividend credit method, corporations continue to pay federal income tax. Thus, no change will result in the
federal corporate taxable income on which most states base corporate net income for purposes of their income tax law. If the corporation receives a dividend from another corporation, however, the
corporation will be required to include in taxable income for state
purposes the federal income tax paid by the payor of the dividend
that is attributable to the dividend.20 2 In the states whose corporate
income tax base conforms to the federal income tax base, however,
no provisions permit the recipient of a dividend to deduct the federal
income tax attributable to the dividend from taxable income.2 03 In
199. See the illustrations in Appendix I infra. Except for rate changes and the time value
of money, the long-run effect on state income tax revenues is not affected by the corporate
dividend rate because corporate earnings are distributed as dividends, distributed on termination of the corporation, or realized as income when a shareholder sells stock. This assumes
that the state taxes the gain on the sale as it taxes other income, which most states do. See, e.g.,
72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7303(a)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1981). However, it is important to the
state to ascertain the effect in a particular year of income tax integration at the federal level on
its income tax system. Thus, the short run effects of the corporate dividend rate are quite
relevant.
200. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-203(b)(2)(B) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); N.Y. TAX LAW
ch. 60, § 208(9)(b)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1980). This type of provision creates an interesting
problem if none of the adjustment described in notes 184-85 and accompanying text supra
apply, other than the add-back of state income tax deducted in computing federal taxable
income. The state income tax cannot be computed until the state taxable income is computed.
Since the state taxable income consists solely of the state income tax, however, the state income
tax cannot be computed until the state income tax is computed. If any other state adjustments
are made to federal taxable income, the problem can be algebraically resolved. Otherwise the
state income tax must be zero.
201. Illinois, New York, and Ohio do not permit the deduction of federal income taxes in
computing corporate or individual taxable income. See 41 STATE TAX REv. (CCH) No. 51, at
4, 6 (December 16, 1980). Six states, however, permit corporations to deduct federal income
taxes in computing taxable income, and seventeen states permit individuals to do likewise,
usually subject to limitations. Id The analysis in this article is based on the Illinois approach.
To this extent, modifications in the analysis must be made for those states with the opposite
approach.
The difficulty in determining the immediate effect of full integration on the income tax
systems of states similar to Ohio, Illinois, and New York is demonstrated by illustrations in
Appendix I infra.
202. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220.12(1) (West Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2203(b)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); N.Y. TAX LAW ch. 60, § 208(9) (McKinney 1966 & Supp.
1981); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5733.04(f) (Page 1973); 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7401(3)
(Purdon Supp. 1981).
203. If the new federal provisions requiring a recipient of a dividend to include all or a
portion of the federal corporate income tax attributable to the dividend in gross income are

these states, therefore, income tax revenues
from corporations that
204
slightly.
increase
will
dividends
receive
The effect of the dividend credit method of integration at the
federal level on state individual income taxation varies. In Penn-

sylvania, no effect will occur since individual taxable income is computed without regard to federal taxable income. Florida will also be
unaffected since no individual income tax exists in that state. Simi-

larly, in states where the individual income tax base conforms to the
federal income tax base 20 5 no noticeable effect will result. Individuals receiving dividends will be required to include in taxable income

for state purposes the federal income tax paid by the corporation
that is attributable to the dividend. 2

6

Because the tax laws of these

states do not contain provisions permitting the recipient of a dividend to deduct the federal income tax attributable to the dividend
from taxable income,20 7 the revenue that these states receive from
individual income taxes will increase to some extent.2 0 8
The combined effect of a federal dividend credit method of integration on the corporate and individual income taxes of the states
varies according to the particular tax system of each state.2° In
placed in section 78 of the Internal Revenue Code, the conclusion in the text would need to be
changed. In this case, there would be no effect in those states whose income tax laws presently
exclude the section 78 "gross-up" from state taxable income. See notes 129-31 and accompanying text supra. It is probable that new federal provisions would not be inserted in section 78.
204. See note 192 supra. In 1977, domestic corporations paid $61.5 billion in dividends, of
which $13.9 billion were paid to other domestic corporations. IRS 1977 CORPORTrION INCOME TAX STATISTICS, supra note 187, at 13. Of course, if the federal dividend credit provisions do not permit recipients of dividends corporations to claim the credit, there would be no
effect on state corporate income tax revenues.
205. See note 191 and accompanying text supra If the state bases its individual income
tax liability on a percentage of federal individual income tax liability after credits, the effect of
integration on the state revenues is compounded.
206. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-203(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); N.Y. TAX LAW ch.
60, § 612 (McKinney Supp. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN., § 5747.01(S) (Page Supp. 1975).
207. See notes 203-04 and accompanying text supra. Likewise, there are no provisions in
the income tax laws of these states permitting the shareholder to claim a credit for the federal
income taxes paid by the corporation.
208. See note 192 and accompanying text supra In 1974, individuals listing Illinois as
their state of residence for federal tax purposes reported $1.7 billion in dividends, after the
dividend exclusion of section 116 of the Internal Revenue Code was applied. This statistic is
approximate for purposes of estimating the Illinois revenue effect because there may be a few
of those individuals whose residences for state tax purposes were not in Illinois, and there also
were some part-year Illinois residents. The statistic is, however, sufficiently approximate that
the impact of the dividend credit method of integration on Illinois revenues is evident. For
Ohio and New York, the amounts were $1.2 billion and $3.47 billion, respectively. U.S. DEP'T
OF THE TREASURY, I.R.S., PRELIMINARY STATISTICS OF INCOME-1978 INDIVIDUAL INCOME
TAX RETURNS, Pub. 198, at 49-50 (1980).
To estimate the amount of federal income tax attributable to those dividends that would
be included in state taxable income, these amounts must be multiplied by 48/52, the reciprocal
inverse of the approximate dividend to corporate federal income tax ratio. Thus, shareholders
in Illinois, Ohio, and New York would include approximately $1.57 billion, $1.1 billion, and
$3.2 billion in state individual taxable income, respectively.
209. See note 193 supra If no dividends are distributed in the state, no effect on state
income tax revenues will occur. See Appendix I infra This highly theoretical possibility is
pursued no further in this article.

Florida and Pennsylvania, where no effect will occur at the individual income tax level, an increase in state income tax revenues will
depend on the relative proportion of shareholders that are corporations and on the corporate dividend rate.2 1° In the other statesIllinois, Ohio, and New York-the result will be an increase in revenue from corporate and individual income taxes. The extent of the
increase depends on two factors. First, the corporate dividend rate is
relevant for the same reason it is a factor in determining the immediate effect of full integration on state income tax revenues. 21 ' Second,
the relative proportion of shareholders that are corporations and the
average corporate income tax rate in comparison to the average individual income tax rate are important factors because they determine
the level at which the federal income tax paid by the payor of the
dividend will be subject to state income tax.2 12
D.

DividendDeduction
States that require corporations to compute state taxable income

by making adjustments to federal taxable income will be affected by
adoption of a dividend deduction method of integration at the federal level. Under the dividend deduction method of integration, federal taxable income of corporations is reduced to the extent of
dividends paid. 2 3 Accordingly, state taxable income of the corporations is reduced and there will be a decrease in state corporate in214
come tax revenues.

The dividend deduction method of integration has no effect on
state individual income tax revenues. Florida has no individual income tax. Pennsylvania calculates individual income without regard
to the federal system. Illinois, Ohio, and New York are not affected
210. See note 198 and accompanying text supra
211. See notes 198-99, 201 and accompanying text supra
212. For example, assume that Corporation X distributes a $1,000 dividend to its shareholders. Further assume that the federal income tax paid by X with respect to that $1,000 is
$923. To pay a dividend of $1,000 when the federal corporate income tax rate is 48%, X must
earn $1,923 ($1,000 divided by .52, the correlative of .48). If the shareholders of X are corporations whose average state income tax rate is 5%, state income tax revenues increase by $46.15
($923 X .05). If the shareholders of X are individuals whose average state income tax rate is
3%, state income tax revenues increased by $27.69 ($923 x .03).
If some or all of the shareholders were corporations, the numbers in the example would
change, but the principle would remain unchanged. See note 201 supra and Appendix I mfra.
The result in this example differs from that with respect to full integration because, unlike the
case of full integration, the corporation pays state income tax. The importance of the corporate dividend rate is demonstrated by illustrations in Appendix 11 infra.
213. See note 30 and accompanying text supra. If no corporations pay dividends, which is
an extreme case, there would be no effect. This possibility is pursued no further in this article.
At the other extreme is maximum dividend payout. The effect on state corporate income tax
revenues in that case resembles full integration. See note 200 supra. The problem described in
note 200 supra with respect to computation of state income taxes does not exist if there is
partial dividend payout because in that case there is some corporate taxable income on which
algebraic computations mentioned in note 200 supra can be based.
214. See note 204 supra

because the federal individual income tax base to which the states
conform their individual income tax bases is not affected by the dividend deduction method of integration.
The combined effect of the dividend deduction method of integration on the corporate and individual income taxes of the states is
a decrease in state income tax revenues.
E

Dividend Exclusion

State revenues from the corporate income tax would be slightly
affected by the adoption of a dividend exclusion method of integration at the federal level. There is no effect on revenues from corporations that are shareholders in other corporations in states that
presently provide a full intercorporate dividend exclusion or deduction.21 5 In states that do not provide a full intercorporate dividend
exclusion or deduction 2 1 6 state corporate income tax revenues from
these corporations will decrease.21 7
The effect of the dividend exclusion method of integration on
state individual income taxation varies. In Pennsylvania, no effect
occurs because individual taxable income is computed without regard to federal taxable income. In Florida, no effect occurs because
no individual income tax exists. In states in which the individual
income tax base conforms to the federal income tax base, the effect
depends on the technical language of the state tax law. In Illinois,
there is no effect because the tax statute requires individuals to add
to taxable income all dividends that were excluded from federal
gross income. 2 18 Because New York and Ohio do not have similar
provisions 219 individual income tax revenues in these states will decrease because the dividends excluded from federal taxable income
are not added back.2 2 °
The combined effect of the dividend exclusion method varies
from state to state. In Florida, the result is a decrease in corporate
income tax revenues from corporations that are shareholders. The
amount of the decrease is the extent of the tax attributable to the
215. See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.04(I)(4), (6), (7), (8) (Page 1973); 72 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7401(3) (Purdon Supp. 1977).
216. New York permits exclusion of one-half of dividends received from corporations that
are not subsidiaries, and of all dividends from subsidiaries. N.Y. TAX LAW ch. 60,
§ 208(9)(a)(1), (2) (McKinney Supp. 1981). Florida and Illinois adopt the federal 85% dividend received deduction. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 220.13(2) (West Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
120, § 2-203(d)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981). See note 3 supra
217. See note 204 jupra.
218. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-203(a)(2)(A) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981).
219. If the provision in the state tax law that requires individuals to add back dividends
excluded from federal gross income does so by reference to section 116 of the Internal Revenue Code, the outcome will change depending on whether the dividend exclusion underlying
integration at the federal level is placed in section 116.
220. See note 208 jupra

fifteen percent of intercorporate dividends not already excluded. 22 '
Pennsylvania will experience no effect since corporations that are
shareholders presently exclude intercorporate dividends, 222 and individual income taxes are computed without regard to federal taxable
income. In Ohio, state income tax revenues decrease as a result of
the exclusion of dividends from individual taxable income.2 21 The
effect is the same in New York, except an additional decrease in state
income tax revenues results because certain intercorporate dividends
not presently excluded are excluded.224 In Illinois, as in Florida,225
corporations are required to add back excluded dividends to taxable
income, with a resultant decrease in corporate income tax revenues
from corporations that are shareholders.
F

Split Corporate Tax Rates
Because the split-value method of integration involves the com-

putation of tax and not taxable income, states will not be affected by
adoption of this method at the federal level.2 2 6 No state requires

corporations to compute state
income tax liability as a percentage of
2 27
federal income tax liability.

G. Repeal of CorporateIncome Tax

States that require corporations to compute state taxable income
by making adjustments to federal taxable income would be adversely affected by the repeal of the federal corporate income tax. If
the double taxation of corporate earnings distributed as dividends is
terminated by repeal of the federal corporate income tax, state taxa-

ble income of the corporation will be zero, unless the corporation has
items of income excluded from its federal gross income or has taken
deductions on its federal return for which there are adjustments required by the state tax law. The states, therefore, will experience a
drastic decrease in corporate income tax revenues.228
221. Id
222. Id
223. See notes 219-20 and accompanying text supra
224. See note 216 supra In New York, the relative proportion of shareholders that are
corporations and the average corporate income tax rate in comparison to the average individual income tax rate will affect the measurement of the revenue loss, in the same manner as
those factors affect the analysis of the dividend credit method of integration. See note 212
supraz
225. See note 216 and accompanying text supra.
226. Even though the imposition of a zero percent tax on income that is distributed as
dividends is a form of split-rate integration that produces the same result at the federal level as
the dividend deduction method of integration, see note 37 supra, the effect at the state level
differs because the latter method relies on a change in the definition of taxable income while
the former does not.
227. If there were such states, their revenues from the corporate income tax would be
affected. This analysis is pursued no further in this article.
228. The effect at the corporate level is the same as it is with respect to full integration.
See note 188 and accompanying text supra.

Adoption of integration by repeal of the federal corporate income tax will not affect state individual income tax revenue because
individual income tax is not changed under this method.22 9

The combined effect of the repeal of the federal corporate income tax is a significant decrease in state income tax revenues.
IV.

The State in Isolation: The Response to Income Tax

Integration
A.

Reasonsfor Response

1. Adoption of Integration
(a) Automatic.-A state may effectively adopt certain methods

of integration if its tax law contains a provision that automatically
adopts any change in the federal tax law relating to the computation
of gross, adjusted gross, or taxable income.230 The Illinois tax law,
for example, provides as follows:
[A] taxpayer's gross income, adjusted gross income, or taxable income for the taxable year shall mean the amount of gross
income, adjusted gross income or taxable income properly reportable for federal income tax purposes for the taxable year under the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.2 3 '
In states whose corporate and individual income tax bases conform
233
to the federal income tax bases, 232 automatic adoption of virtually
full integration will occur.2 34 Automatic adoption of the dividend

credit and dividend exclusion methods of integration will occur if a
state bases individual income tax liability on a percentage of federal
income tax liability after credits.2 35 A state whose corporate taxable
229. If the $100 dividend exclusion were repealed, see note 40 supra, states that have
adopted this provision of the federal law in their conformity to the federal income tax system
would experience a slight increase in individual income tax revenues. See notes 219-20 and
accompanying text supra.
230. This type of provision does not cause adoption of the split-rate method of integration.
231. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-203(d)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977). This provision is
permitted by the Illinois Constitution, which provides:
Laws imposing taxes on or measured by income may adopt by reference provisions of
the laws and regulations of the United States, as they then exist or thereafter may be
changed, for the purpose of arriving at the amount of income upon which the tax is
imposed.
ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 3(b). The use of automatic "trigger" statutes that cause state adoption of
all federal tax law changes without state legislative action has probably stopped. See the
description of the experience of Oregon with such a provision in REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TAX ADMINISTRATORS, FEDERAL COLLECTION OF STATE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES UNDER PUBLIC LAW 92-512, at 28-29 (1972) [hereinafter cited as NATA REPORT]. See note 181 supra.
232. Twenty-eight states have corporate and individual income tax bases that conform to
the respective federal base. See 41 STATE TAx REv. (CCH) No. 51, at 4-7 (December 16,

1980).
233. The existence of state adjustments to federal taxable income prevents complete adoption of full integration. See notes 184-88 and accompanying text supra
234. See notes 193-201 and accompanying text supra.
235.

If the state income tax liability of an individual is computed as a percentage of fed-

income base conforms to the federal corporate taxable income base
will automatically adopt the dividend deduction and corporate income tax repeal methods of integration, unless the state tax law has
provisions preventing this effect.23 6 Automatic adoption of the dividend exclusion method of integration will result in a state if its individual taxable income base conforms to the federal individual
income tax base, unless its tax law requires the add-back of dividends.23 7 Finally, in Florida, which has no individual income tax, a
form of integration already exists since dividends are not taxed
twice. 238
(b) Piggybacking.-A "piggybacking" system includes an
agreement between a state and the Secretary of the Treasury for federal collection of state income taxes. If piggybacking is in effect
when integration is adopted at the federal level, automatic adoption
of integration will occur. The piggybacking provisions of the Internal Revenue Code 23 9 apply only if the individual income taxes of the
state that enters into the federal collection agreement conform to the
federal income tax base.2 "° Thus, unless a state is willing to withdraw from a piggybacking agreement that is in effect between itself
and the Secretary of the Treasury, it will adopt integration.
(c) Precedent and tradition.-States whose tax laws do not
cause automatic adoption of income tax integration may find that
tradition mandates the adoption of integration. At least thirty-three
states have individual income tax bases that conform to the federal
individual income tax base. 24 1 At least thirty-five states have corporate income tax bases that conform to the federal corporate income
tax base.24 2 If the state tax law conforms to the federal individual
income tax base on a particular date,2 43 or if the method of integration adopted at the federal level is one that does not cause an autoeral income tax liability before federal credits, there will not be complete adoption of the
dividend credit method of integration. See note 205 supra
236.

See note 181 supra

237. See note 218 and accompanying text supra If the provision in the state tax law that
requires individuals to add back dividends excluded from federal gross income does so by
reference to section 116 of the Internal Revenue Code, integration will be adopted if the dividend exclusion underlying integration at the federal level is not placed in section 116. See
note 219 supra.
238. As explained in the text accompanying note 194 supra, however, the immediate effect
of the adoption of full integration at the federal level on the income tax system of Florida
would be no taxation of corporate earnings, whether or not distributed as dividends.
239. I.R.C. §§ 6361-6365.
240. Id § 6362. The conformity can be by reference to federal taxable income or adjusted
gross income, or the computation of state income tax liability by reference to federal income
tax liability. See note 191 supra.
241. See note 191 supra
242. See note 181 supra
243.

Id

matic adoption of integration under the state tax law, 2' integration
will not be adopted by the state unless it affirmatively decides to do
so. If a state does not adopt integration, its individual tax system
will be considerably dissimilar to the federal system. The state will
lose its traditional similarity to the federal system, and the benefits of
that similarity. 45 Subtle political pressure may persuade the state to
follow in the footsteps of the federal government. 2 Although some
states structure their income tax systems independently of the federal
system, 247 a substantial number follow the federal structure, indicating a reluctance to stray from federal statutory tax precedent. Many
states follow, either fully or partially, the federal integration treatment of Subchapter S corporations 248 and DISCs.2 49 Hence, it is
possible that integration will occur even in states in which adoption
is not automatic.
(d) Internalrevenue gain-A state might adopt integration because it anticipates an increase in income tax revenues. 250 For example, adoption of full integration at the federal level would cause
increased revenues in a state if the state's corporate and individual
income tax bases conform to the federal base, provided that the average individual income tax rate exceeds the average corporate income
tax rate and the average corporate dividend rate is not too close to
full earnings distribution.25 ' Increased revenues would also occur in
a state whose corporate and individual income tax bases conform to
the federal base if the dividend credit method of integration were
adopted at the federal level.2 52 As noted below,253 however, this aspect of the adoption of income tax integration at the federal level is
significant only as an analytical starting-point-when the state examines its revenue position in light of the existence of other states in
the federal system.
244. The split-rate method of integration is an example. See notes 226-27 and accompa-

nying text supra
245. This may trouble some state taxpayers. See note 258 and accompanying text infra
246. The proponents of integration at the federal level probably will focus on the state
legislatures if they are successful in Congress.
247. Pennsylvania for example, has adopted a very unique individual income tax. See
note 190 and accompanying text supra.
248. See, e.g., notes 98-99 and accompanying text supra For additional examples of administrative variations of state income tax treatment of Subchapter S corporations, see notes
521-31 and accompanying text infra.
249. See, e.g., notes 116-20 and accompanying text supra There is also some degree of
state conformity with respect to regulated investment companies and real estate investment
trusts, which resemble integration. See, e.g., OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5733.04 (Page 1973).

250.
251.
252.
253.

See
See
See
See

notes 178-80 and accompanying text supra
Appendix I ifra.
Appendix II infra.
notes 330-41 and accompanying text mfra.

(e) Externalrevenue gain.-An anticipated shift of income tax
revenue from outside a state to within it might persuade the state to
adopt integration. This extremely complex aspect of the adoption of
income tax integration at the federal level is explored below.2 54
(0 Administrative andpragmaticreasons.- A state might adopt
integration to avoid administrative and pragmatic problems that
would otherwise arise. If the federal government ceases to impose
an income tax on corporations, 255 the state that continues such a tax
will be required to assume the burden of developing the law and
policy of corporate income tax. This problem would not be immediately noticeable, but would be aggravated as social, economic, and
political climates change. The state that continues a corporate income tax would lose the benefits of congressional studies, Treasury
regulations and rulings, and federal judicial resolutions. 256 Most
states that reject integration 2 57 must develop special adjustments to
their tax statutes and tax forms. The additional complexity to the
state tax statute alone is a serious problem.258
2. Rejection of Integration
(a) Automatic.-A state may, in effect, reject integration because its state tax laws are so independent of federal tax laws that
under certain methods of integration there is no change in state corporate and individual income taxation. For example, the split-rate
method of integration is automatically rejected because it has no effect on any state.25 9 In Pennsylvania, where individual income taxation is independent of the federal system, the dividend credit 26° and
dividend exclusion 26' methods of integration will be rejected until
the legislature affirmatively adopts integration.
(b) Constitutionalproblems.- The constitution of a state could
require rejection of one or more methods of integration. For example, the Illinois Constitution provides that "tax on or measured by
income shall be at a non-graduated rate" 2 62 and therefore precludes
adoption of the split-rate method of integration. The constitution of
254. Id
255. This occurs if full integration is adopted and if the corporate income tax is repealed.
See notes 21-25, 39-40 and accompanying text supra;
256. This is not to suggest that a state could not maintain a corporate income tax system in
the absence of a comparable federal corporate income tax.
257. See notes 290-314 and accompanying text infra This is not true with respect to the
split-rate method of integration.
258. This is especially true if the state has intentionally taken advantage of conformity to
the federal income tax system.
259. See notes 226-27 and accompanying text supra
260. See notes 201-12 and accompanying text Supra
261. See notes 215-25 and accompanying text supra
262. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 3(a).

New York provides that "[u]ndistributed profits shall not be
taxed."2'63 This provision apparently prevents adoption of full integration. 26 In a case upholding the taxation of a shareholder on his
share of the undistributed taxable income of a Subchapter S corporation,265 however, a New York court held the constitutional provision
to be offset by another constitutional provision 266 that authorizes
adoption
of federal law in any New York law imposing an income
7
26

tax.

(c) State autonomy.-A state's desire to be independent of the
federal income tax system could cause it to ignore the federal adoption of integration. This reaction parallels the reaction of states
whose tax systems have traditional similarity to the federal system.
(d) Internal revenue loss.-Under certain circumstances, a
state might reject integration because adoption would result in a decrease in income tax revenues.268 If full integration, for example,
were adopted at the federal level a decrease in revenue would result
in a state whose tax base conforms to the federal base, but with no
individual income tax,2 69 or with an individual income tax that is
computed without regard to the federal system.2 7 ° A similar effect
would result in a state whose corporate and individual income tax
bases conform to the federal base if full integration is adopted at the
federal level, provided that the average corporate income tax rate
exceeds the average individual income tax rate. 27 t A third example
arises in a state whose corporate income tax base conforms to the
federal base if a dividend deduction or corporate income tax repeal
method of integration is adopted at the federal level.2 72 A final example involves adoption of a dividend exclusion method of integration at the federal level and states with a tax system similar to those
in Florida, Ohio, New York, or Illinois. 273 This aspect of the adoption of income tax integration at the federal level should not be of
much significance, however, when the state examines its revenue po274
sition in light of the existence of other states in a federal system.
263. N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 3.
264. See Letter from James H. Tully, Jr., Commissioner of Taxation and Finance, State of
New York, to James E. Maule (January 11, 1978) at 4 (on file at the Dickinson School of Law).
265. See notes 93, 96 and accompanying text supra
266. N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 22.
267. Garlin v. Murphy, 51 Misc. 2d 477, 273 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1966).
268. See notes 178-80 and accompanying text supra;
269. See notes 189-91 and accompanying text supra.
270. See note 195 and accompanying text supra
271. See Appendix I infra. Another example is if the average individual income tax rate
exceeds the average corporate income tax rate and the average corporate dividend payout rate
is sufficiently high. See column 3 of illustration at Appendix I infra.
272. See notes 213-15, 228-29 and accompanying text supra.
273. See notes 221-25 and accompanying text supra
274. See notes 330-41 and accompanying text infrax

(e) External revenue loss.-Integration could be rejected by a
state because it anticipates a shift of income tax revenue from within
its borders to outside them. This extremely complex aspect of the
adoption of income tax integration at the federal level is explored
below.

2 75

69 Administrative andpragmaticreasons.-A state might reject
integration to avoid administrative and pragmatic problems that
otherwise would arise.27 6 Numerous problems exist even if no nonresident corporations or shareholders are subject to income taxation
by a state that adopts integration.2 77 Under full integration or a dividend credit method of integration, for example, corporations would
be required to maintain detailed tax records on each shareholder,
just as partnerships must maintain tax records for their partners.2 78
These problems would be similar to those experienced by Massachusetts with its integrated property tax. 279 The advent of computerized
record keeping, however, would minimize problems in this area.2 8 °
Unresolved issues at the federal level pose serious problems for
states and may detract from the desirability of integration. Although
a state that adopts integration probably will accept the federal resolution of these issues, a state could decide that the federal resolution
creates additional problems. The state that resolves the problem differently than at the federal level might find that the resolution itself
will create problems. If these problems are sufficiently troublesome
or require solutions that conflict with fundamental state policy, the
28
state might decide to reject integration. Some of these problems '
are the treatment of shareholders who own stock for less than a full
taxable year,2 82 the treatment of subsequent audit adjustments to
corporate distributive or taxable income,2 83 and the treatment of
shareholders that are tax-exempt organizations.2 84 Other problems
include the need for transitional rules to specify the treatment of ac275.

Id

276. Many of these problems involve the interstate aspects of state income taxation and
are discussed in notes 330-502 and accompanying text infra.
277. The interstate aspects of state income taxation compounds these problems.
278. See McKessy, supra note 7, in which the author states that the "filing tax requirements that partnerships and their partners must comply with are currently the most burdensome that any form of business can or will encounter." Id at 378. Mr. McKessy suggests that
the paperwork will overwhelm taxpayer and tax administrator alike, as well as hinder enforcement and discourage compliance. Id
279. See notes 52-63 and accompanying text supra.
280. But see Clarke, supra note 7, at 376. The position suggested by Mr. Clarke finds
support in the phenomenal increase in the number and complexity of corporate transactions in
the past one hundred years, which might more than offset the advances in the computerized
data processing field made in the past twenty-five years.
281. These problems do not arise with respect to every method of income tax integration.
282.
283.

See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 21, at 71; Gourevitch, supra note 26, at 87.
See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 21, at 74; Gourevitch, supra note 26, at 87.

284.

Comm. on Corporations of the Tax Section of the N.Y. St. Bar A., supra note 1, at 49.

cumulated undistributed income 285 and the treatment of dividends
paid in property and constructive dividends.286
An interesting pragmatic issue is whether integration will benefit a state economy as it presumably will benefit the national economy. 287 The problems that proponents of integration seek to solve at
the federal level may not exist at the state level, 288 and a state therefore may not necessarily require integration.289
B.

Methods of Rejecting Integration
1.

Full Integration.- States that require corporations to com-

pute state taxable income by making adjustments to federal taxable
income can easily avoid the effect that full integration at the federal
level might have on state corporate income taxation. 29° Since corporations are required under full integration to continue computing
federal net income to determine the distributive share of each share-

holder,2 9 ' states can require corporations to compute state taxable
income by making adjustments to federal net income. 92
Whether a state must adjust its individual income tax if full integration is adopted at the federal level depends on the effect of full
integration on the individual income tax system of the state. In
Pennsylvania, no response is required because the adoption of full
integration at the federal level does not affect the individual income
tax.29 3 States whose individual income tax base conforms to the federal income tax base can avoid the effect on state individual income
taxation of full integration 294 by requiring shareholders to deduct
285. See Cohen, supra note 22, at 361, 366; McLure, Integration of Personal and Corporate
Income Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals,supra note 1, at 567.

286. Comm. on Corporations of the Tax Section of the N.Y. St. Bar A., supra note 1,at
55-56.
287. The proponents of income tax integration argue that its adoption would enhance
capital formation. See note 4 supra.
288. McKessy, supra note 7, at 377. Mr. McKessy mentions the special state taxation of
certain businesses and the lack of a federal property or sales tax. Id
289. Although this may be true, the double taxation of dividends by states, from the standpoint of the national economy, compounds the effect of double taxation at the federal level.
290. See notes 181-88 and accompanying text supra.
291. See note 185 supra; Letter from Richard A. Levin, Research Director, State of Ohio
Department of Taxation, to James E. Maule (December 6, 1977) at 2 (on file at the Dickinson
School of Law).
292. There probably will be very little difference between federal corporate taxable income and federal corporate net income. If certain items such as corporate charitable contributions are separately stated, the state will need to net the items together. Another difference
would arise from the probable repeal of the inter-corporate dividends received deduction. An
adjustment to continue the deduction at the state level will be needed in states that presently
provide for it. See Letter from Richard A. Levin, Research Director, State of Ohio Department of Taxation, to James E. Maule (December 6, 1977) at 2 (on file at the Dickinson School
of Law).
293. See notes 189-90 and accompanying text supra,
294. See notes 191-92 and accompanying text supra

their shares of undistributed taxable income of corporations 295 from
federal taxable income, 9 6 for purposes of computing state taxable
income.
2 Dividend Credit.- Generally, if the dividend credit method
of integration is adopted, states need not alter the corporate income
tax to avoid adopting integration. 97 Some action will be needed,
however, to avoid the effect of the dividend credit method on the
computation of corporate taxable income by corporations that are
shareholders. 298 The necessary adjustment is identical to the adjustment required in the individual income tax of states with individual
income tax bases that conform to the federal income tax base.299
As with full integration, a state's decision to modify the individual income tax in response to the adoption of the dividend credit
method depends on the effect of the dividend credit method of integration on the individual income tax system of the state. In Pennsylvania, no action is required because adoption of the dividend
credit method of integration will not affect its individual income
tax. 3" States whose individual income tax bases conform to the federal income tax base can avoid the effect on state individual income
taxation of the dividend credit method of integration 30 ' by requiring
shareholders to deduct their share of the federal corporate income
tax attributable to the dividend from federal taxable income302 for
purposes of computing state taxable income.
295. Undistributed taxable income of corporations is the distributive share of corporate
net income minus dividends. This formulation will permit the state to tax dividends.
296. See Letter from Richard A. Levin, Research Director, State of Ohio Department of
Taxation, to James E. Maule (December 6, 1977) at 2 (on file at the Dickinson School of Law).
For the few states that require individuals to compute income tax liability as a percentage of
federal income tax liability, the adjustment will be somewhat complex. These states must allow a credit against the income tax liability of the individual in an amount equal to the federal
income tax liability of the individual with respect to the undistributed taxable income of the
corporation, multiplied by the percentage used to compute state income tax liability from federal income tax liability. See note 295 supra This raises the issue of how to compute the
federal income tax liability of an individual on the undistributed taxable income of the
corporation.
297. See note 201 and accompanying text supra
298. See notes 202-04 and accompanying text supra
299. Even states that do not need to adjust their taxation of individual income must alter
taxation of corporate income to reject income tax integration.
300. See note 205 and accompanying text supra
301. See notes 205-08 and accompanying text supra
302. See Letter from Richard A. Levin, Research Director, State of Ohio Department of
Taxation, to James E. Maule (December 6, 1977) at 3 (on file at the Dickinson School of Law).
For the few states that require individuals to compute income tax liability as a percentage of
federal income tax liability, the adjustment will be rather complex. These states will need to
do several things. First, these states will need to add to the tax liability of the individual an
amount equal to the federal corporate income tax attributable to the dividend, multiplied by
the percentage used to compute state income tax liability from federal income tax liability.
Second, these states will need to allow a credit against the tax liability of the individual in an
amount equal to the federal income tax liability of the individual on the corporate income tax
attributable to the dividend, multiplied by the percentage used to compute state income tax
liability from federal income tax liability. As with full integration, this raises the issue of how

3. Dividend Deduction.-States that require corporations to
compute state taxable income by making adjustments to federal taxable income can easily avoid the effect of the dividend deduction
method at the federal level on state corporate income taxation.30 3
Since corporations are allowed a deduction for dividends paid under
the dividend deduction method of integration, these states can require corporations to add back the dividends paid deduction to federal taxable income for purposes of computing state taxable
income.
Since the adoption of the dividend deduction method of integration at the federal level does not affect state individual income
taxation,30 5 states can reject integration by inaction with respect to
the individual income tax.3 °6
4. DividendExclusion.-In general, states adjust the corporate
income tax to avoid adopting integration if the federal government
adopts the dividend exclusion method of integration.30 7 Some action
will be needed, however, to avoid the effect of the dividend exclusion
method on computation of corporate taxable income in those states
where the amount, if any, of the intercorporate dividend exclusion or
deduction is increased by the adoption of this method of integration.30 8 In these states, corporations that are shareholders must be
required to add back to federal taxable income, in computing state
taxable income, the portion of the intercorporate dividend that the
state does not wish to exclude from state income taxation.
As with full integration and the dividend credit method of integration, whether a state must respond by adjusting its individual income tax if the dividend exclusion method is adopted at the federal
level depends on the effect of the dividend exclusion method of integration on the individual income tax system of the state. In Pennsylvania and Illinois, no action is required because the adoption of
the dividend exclusion method does not affect their individual income tax.30 9 In New York and Ohio, individuals, in computing state
taxable income, must be required to add back to federal taxable income the dividends that the state does not wish to exclude from state
to compute the federal income tax liability of an individual on the corporate income tax attributable to the dividend. See note 296 supra
303. See notes 213-14 and accompanying text supra
304. See Letter from Richard A. Levin, Research Director, State of Ohio Department of
Taxation, to James E. Maule (December 6, 1977) at 2 (on file at the Dickinson School of Law).
305. See note 215 and accompanying text supra
306. Of course, the proper corporate adjustments must be made. See note 304 and accompanying text supra.
307. See note 215 and accompanying text supra
308. See notes 216-17 and accompanying text supra.
309. See note 218 and accompanying text supra

income taxation.

°

5. Split Corporate Tax Rate.-Since adoption of the split-rate
method of integration at the federal level does not effect state income

taxation, 311 the states can reject integration by inaction.
6. Repeal of CorporateIncome Tax.-States that require cor-

porations to compute state taxable income by making adjustments to
federal taxable income must take steps to avoid the effect that repeal
of federal corporate income tax would have on state corporate income taxation. These states must define corporate taxable income

either by adoption of their own sets of rules for gross income and
deductions or by reference to the Internal Revenue Code as it existed
prior to the repeal of the federal corporate income tax. Both meth-

ods require the states to assume responsibility for shaping corporate
income tax policy in the future. 2
Since repeal of the federal corporate income tax does not affect
state individual income taxation,31 3 the states can effectively reject

integration by allowing the individual income tax to remain
intact.3 14
C

Methods ofAdopting Integration
1. Full Integration.-States that require corporations to com-

pute state taxable income by making adjustments to federal taxable
income can adopt full integration by not changing the corporate income tax.31 5
The effect of full integration at the federal level on the state
individual income tax system determines whether the state must act
upon its individual income tax to adopt full integration. States
whose individual income tax base conforms to the federal income
310. Ifa state that requires that dividends excluded from gross income be added back to
state taxable income does so by reference to section 116 of the Internal Revenue Code, there is
no need for action if the federal dividend exclusion provisions are placed in section 116. If the
federal provisions are placed in another section, however, the action required by the state is the
addition of a reference to that section in the provisions of its income tax law requiring that
dividends excluded from gross income be added back to state taxable income. See note 219
.rupra.

311. See notes 226-27 and accompanying text supra
312. See notes 255-56 and accompanying text supra.
313. See note 218 and accompanying text supra
314. Of course, the proper corporate adjustments must be made.
315. Two technical amendments would be required. One amendment is needed to require
shareholders to include in taxable income their distributive shares of the adjustments to federal
corporate taxable income for purposes of computing state corporate taxable income under
present law. See notes 184-87 and accompanying text supra The second amendment is
needed to repeal the requirement that state corporate income taxes deducted in computing
federal taxable income of corporations must be added back to that income. This amendment
would resolve the problem outlined in note 200 supra. These amendments are not needed by
states that require individuals to compute income tax liability as a percentage of federal income tax liability.

tax base can adopt full integration by inaction.31 6 In Pennsylvania,
the state tax law would need a new provision requiring individuals to
include in income their shares of the undistributed net income of the
corporation. 1 7
2. Dividend Credit.- States will not need to modify the corporate income tax to adopt the dividend credit method of integration
because this method generally does not affect the income taxation of
corporations.318 Certain adjustments must be made, however, in the
computation of corporate tax liability by corporations that are shareholders. 319 These modifications are identical to the adjustments that

are necessary in the individual income tax of states whose individual
income tax bases conform to the federal income tax base.
The changes that must be made in the individual income tax in
order to adopt the dividend credit method vary according to the individual income tax system of the particular state. Pennsylvania tax
law would need two new provisions. One provision would permit
individuals receiving corporate dividends to claim a tax credit for the
portion of the state income tax paid by the corporation that is attributable to those dividends. A second provision would include that
credit in the income of the individuals. States whose individual income tax bases conform to the federal income tax base must take the
two steps necessary in Pennsylvania and add a third step.320 The
third step requires shareholders to deduct their share of the corporate federal income tax attributable to the dividend from taxable
income.32 '
3. Dividend Deduction.- States that require corporations to
compute state taxable income by making adjustments to federal tax316. This conclusion assumes that proper action is taken regarding the corporate income
tax. See note 315 supra.
317. See note 295 supra
318. See note 202 and accompanying text supra.
319. See notes 202-04 and accompanying text supra.
320. See note 321 and accompanying text infra For the few states that require individuals
to compute income tax liability as a percentage of federal income tax liability, the required
steps are quite complex. First, the steps outlined in note 302 supra must be taken. Next, the
state income tax paid by the corporation that is attributable to the dividends must be computed. See note 296 supra. The amount so computed is the dividend credit against the state
income tax liability of the shareholder. In addition, however, this state credit must itself be
included, in effect, in state taxable income. To do so, the federal income tax liability that
would be attributable to that state income tax if it were included in federal taxable income
must be computed, and multiplied by the percentage used to compute state income tax liability
from Federal income tax liability.
It is incorrect to assume that since the federal income tax liability of individuals in these
states reflects the adoption of the dividend credit method of integration, no action must be
taken. The complexity arises because the federal income tax liability takes into accountfederal income taxes paid by the corporation, and not state income taxes paid by it.
321. See note 302 and accompanying text supra. For the few states that require individuals to compute income tax liability as a percentage of federal income tax liability, this step
requires the complicated computations outlined in note 302 supra

able income can adopt the dividend deduction method of integration

without changing the corporate income tax. Similarly, states need
not alter the individual income tax in order to adopt integration
since adoption of the dividend deduction method322at the federal level
does not affect state individual income taxation.
4. Dividend Exclusion.-The corporate income tax does not
have to be modified by the state in order to adopt the dividend exclusion method of integration because adoption of that method does not
affect income taxation of corporations that pay dividends. 323 Since
corporations that are shareholders exclude or deduct intercorporate
dividends from federal taxable income in computing state taxable
income as a consequence of the dividend exclusion method of integration no action is needed to adopt integration. The computation
of the state taxable income of these corporations is essentially
unchanged.3 2 4
The nature of the individual income tax system of a state determines whether modifications must be made in the individual income
tax in order to adopt the dividend exclusion method. In New York
and Ohio, no action is necessary because individuals in these states
would exclude dividends from taxable income if the dividend exclusion method were adopted at the federal level.32 5 Illinois would
need to repeal its provision requiring individuals to add back to taxable income all dividends that were excluded from federal gross income. 326 Pennsylvania tax law would need a new provision
permitting individuals to exclude dividends from gross income.32 7
5. Split Corporate Tax Rates.-A state can adopt the split-rate
method of integration by adjusting its corporate income tax rates to
provide a lower rate on corporate income distributed as dividends.
The individual income tax does not need to be altered.
6. Repeal of CorporateIncome Tax.-States requiring corporations to compute state taxable income by making adjustments to
federal taxable income would need to eliminate those adjustments in
order to eliminate the state income tax on this income.328 Since re322. See note 215 and accompanying text supra
323. Id
324. See notes 216-17 and accompanying text supra.
325. See notes 219-20 and accompanying text supra
326. See note 218 and accompanying text supra
327. If a state that requires that dividends excluded from gross income be added back to
state taxable income does so by reference to section 116 of the Internal Revenue Code, there is
no need for action if section 116 is repealed, but action must be taken if the federal dividend
exclusion provisions are placed in section 116. This result is the opposite of that needed to
reject integration. See note 310 supra
328. See note 228 and accompanying text supra.

peal of the federal corporate income tax does not affect state individual income taxation, 329 states do not need to adjust the individual
income tax to adopt this method of integration.
V.

The State in a Federal System: The Effect of Income Tax
Integration

A.

Revenue Shfts

Since shareholders are often residents of states other than those
in which their corporation is resident,3 3 ° it seems likely that full integration or the dividend credit method of integration at the federal
level will cause sizeable revenue shifts among the states. 33 ' The federal nature of modem business transactions could also prevent maximum achievement of the goals a state sets when it decides to adopt
or reject integration. An examination of the fundamental premises
of revenue shifts aids analysis of the situation.3 32
Full integration causes a shifting of income tax liability from
the corporation to the shareholder.33 3 The basic premise of revenue
shifting applicable when full integration occurs is that income tax
revenues shift from states with a proportionately larger share of corporate residents to those with a proportionately larger share of shareholder residents. For example, if a corporation is a resident of Ohio
and its shareholders are residents of Illinois, the tax revenues of Illinois will increase while those of Ohio will decrease.33 4 Certain steps
can be taken to avoid this consequence.3 3 5
The basic premise when the dividend credit method of integration is adopted is the opposite of the premise that is applicable to full
integration. The dividend credit method causes a shifting of income
tax liability from the shareholder to the corporation if the marginal
tax rate of the shareholder is less than the corporate tax rate. It
causes a shifting of income tax liability from the corporation to the
shareholder if the marginal tax rate of the shareholder is greater than
the corporate tax rate.336 Consequently, income tax revenues will
329. See note 229 and accompanying text supra.
330. See notes 178-79 supra
331. See Comm. on Corporations of the Tax Section of the N.Y. St. Bar A., supra note 1,
at 63. One writer called these shifts "serious" and "disastrous." Clarke, supra note 7, at 375.
332. These revenue shifts are analyzed in the next section. See notes 357-502 and accompanying text infra Moreover, due to the complex nature of the federal relationship among the
states, the effect of the response of one state in adopting or rejecting integration on the income
tax system of another state may be different from the effect of its doing nothing in response to
the adoption at the federal level of income tax integration. As to a third state, no effect may
occur.

333. Shareholders would pay all, not a portion as they presently pay, of the income tax
revenues attributable to corporate net income.
334. See McKessy, supra note 7, at 378-79.
335. See notes 360-445 and accompanying text infra For example, these steps might include taxation by Ohio of the Illinois shareholders.
336. The shareholder dividend credit usually will exceed the individual income tax on

shift from states with shareholder residents with relatively lower
marginal tax rates to states with shareholder residents with relatively
higher marginal tax rates, assuming no difference exists in the proportionate distribution of corporate residents. If the proportionate
distribution of corporate residents is unequal, variations and reversals of the revenue shifts will occur.3 37
The basic premise underlying revenue shifts among the states
when the dividend deduction, corporate tax repeal, and split-rate
methods of integration are adopted is that corporate income tax revenue losses will affect states that collect relatively more tax from corporations than from shareholders. 338 This occurs because revenue
losses339 are at the corporate income tax level 34 under these
methods.
Finally, if the dividend exclusion method of integration is
adopted, individual income tax revenue losses will affect states that
collect relatively more tax from shareholders than from corporations.
This occurs because revenue losses are at the individual income tax
level under the dividend exclusion method.34 '
B.

Equity Considerations

Income tax integration presents the states with a serious question about the source of the revenues they use to provide services to
their corporate and individual residents. This question primarily
arises if the state income tax burden is shifted from the corporation
to the individual. It also arises if the shift is in the opposite direction
or if the state rejects integration, because the responses of the other
states to integration will affect residents of the state that adopts or
rejects integration.3 42
The question about the source of the revenues used to provide
state services can be illustrated by a simple example of income tax
integration at the state level. 34 3 Assume that two states, Massachusetts and Mississippi, take the steps necessary to conform their income tax systems to the adoption of full integration at the federal
dividends, except in the highest individual income tax brackets. See illustration in Appendix
II infra.
337. The various permutations of these factors are too numerous and complex to illustrate
individually in this article.
338. See Comm. on Corporations of the Tax Section of the N.Y. St. Bar A., supra note 1,
at 63.
339. The revenue losses are caused by elimination of the double taxation of corporate
earnings distributed as dividends.
340. See Comm'n on Corporations of the Tax Section of the N.Y. St. Bar A., supra note 1,
at 63.
341. See note 224 supra.
342. See notes 357-502 and accompanying text ihafra
343. This example, which in many ways served as a catalyst for the numerous examples in
the next section, was suggested in Clarke, supra note 7, at 375.

level. Assume that as so conformed, the tax statutes of both states

subject resident shareholders, but not nonresident shareholders, to
income taxation on their shares of undistributed net income of the
corporations of which they are shareholders. 3 " Assume that X Corporation is resident in Massachusetts, and its shareholders are residents of Mississippi. Under full integration, the income of X
Corporation is taxed by Mississippi in the hands of the shareholders,
but not by Massachusetts. Massachusetts, however, must continue to
because of the presprovide many services directly to X Corporation 345
state.
the
in
property
physical
ence of corporate
A more complex example of integration at the state level illustrates how the question about the source of revenues used to pay for
state services can arise when a state rejects integration. Assume that
Massachusetts decides to reject integration and structures its income

tax system to produce that result. Mississippi, on the other hand,
adopts full integration and taxes its resident and nonresident shareholders only on their shares of the undistributed net income of cor-

porations resident in Mississippi. 3 Assume that X Corporation is
resident in Massachusetts and all except one of its shareholders are
residents of Mississippi. The other shareholder is a resident of Mas-

sachusetts. Under this income tax system, X Corporation is subject
to income taxation in Massachusetts. The shareholders who are resi-

dents of Mississippi are not subject to income tax on their share of
the undistributed net income of X Corporation. The Massachusetts

shareholder is subject to income tax by Massachusetts on any dividends received from X Corporation. This shareholder might raise a
question of equity concerning the source of revenues used to pay for
services provided by Massachusetts to X Corporation. The question
arises because the share of the net income of X Corporation distributed as a dividend to the Massachusetts shareholder is subject to
344. It is probable that such a method of taxing nonresident shareholders under full integration would not be adopted. See McKessy, supra note 7, at 378-79; notes 360-445 and accompanying text infra.
345. One writer explained, "When a fire breaks out in the corporation's warehouse in
Boston the fire alarm does not ring in Mississippi where the shareholders of that corporation
might live." Clarke, supra note 7, at 375. The imposition of user charges is an alternative that
might solve the problem of the source of revenues used by a state to provide services. See note
520 and accompanying text infra. However, although it is called by a different name, the user
charge is a cost that would have the same economic effect on corporate earnings as a whole as
does the income tax on corporate earnings distributed as dividends that income tax integration
is designed to eliminate. Of course, the user charge shifts the economic burden from the user
of proportionately less state services to the user of proportionately greater state services. If the
argument that states do not need income tax integration is accepted, see note 289 and accompanying text supra, the user charge provides a means of avoiding the complexity caused by not
conforming to income tax integration at the federal level without impairing state revenues.
See note 520 and accompanying text mfna
346. Assume that Mississippi does so on its assumption that other states will tax residents
of Mississippi who are shareholders in corporations in those other states. Mississippi might not
structure its full integration in this manner.

greater taxation than the remainder of the net income.3 47 This prob-

lem is no different than the one that exists today, however, if the
shares of a corporation resident in Massachusetts with one Massachusetts shareholder are owned by residents of Florida, where dividends are not taxed.
The equity of the particular income tax system that a state uses
to collect the revenues which permit it to provide services must be
considered before a state can decide how to react to income tax integration at the federal level. These equity questions affect both the
state response to income tax integration at the federal level and the
manner in which that response is implemented, because the response
must be made
in the context of the state in a federal system and not
34
in isolation.

1

C. Administrative Problems
Income tax integration also presents the states with the problem
of administering a method of income taxation that adopts or rejects
income tax integration in the context of the federal relationship
among the states. The problems of tax administration in the federal
context arise if certain methods of integration are adopted at the federal level, regardless of whether the state adopts or rejects integration. Adoption of the split-rate, dividend deduction, or corporate tax
repeal methods of integration at the federal level presents administrative problems primarily for states that adopt integration.349
Some of the problems of tax administration raised by the adoption of income tax integration at the federal level concern the federal
nature of modern business transactions. Shareholders are often residents of states other than those in which the corporation is resident.350 States must provide rules for shareholders who change their
state of residence during the taxable year. These provisions must
include rules for shareholders who change residence from a state
that has adopted integration to a state that has not adopted it, and
vice versa. Corporate reorganizations of multistate corporations
whose shareholders who are residents of several states, which may or
may not have adopted income tax integration, will require complex
technical rules for all except the split-rate method of integration.351
347.

Moreover Massachusetts, for example, does not provide greater fire protection for the

portion of the warehouse of X Corporation that is attributable to the interest of the Massachusetts shareholder in X Corporation. See note 345 supra
348. The myriad ways in which these issues can arise become evident when the various
permutations of state reactions to income tax integration at the federal level are analyzed. See
notes 357-502 and accompanying text i/na
349. See notes 490-95, 502 and accompanying text n~fa.
350. See note 331 and accompanying text supra.
351. States that do not adopt integration also will be able to manage without many of
these special rules for corporate reorganizations if the method of integration adopted at the

Finally, states will need to administer records for nonresident shareholders, a task that the state would not have to perform in the absence of income tax integration at the federal level.3 5
Other tax administration problems that are raised by income tax
integration and complicated by the federal relationship among the
states are extensions of the administrative problems faced by the
states in isolation.3 53 Under certain circumstances, for example,
states that reject integration need to make special adjustments to
their tax statutes and forms.3 54 The existence of nonresident corporations and shareholders increases the number of special adjustments that are required.3 5 5 States that adopt integration face a series
of problems, also presented at the federal level, relating to tax-exempt shareholders, part-year shareholders, audit adjustments, and
transition rules.3 56 These problems exist in greater proportions
within the context of the federal system.
VI.

The State in a Federal System: The Response to Income
Tax Integration

A.

Introduction

An analysis of the actions that states can take in response to the
adoption of income tax integration at the federal level, when considered in the context of the federal relationship among the states, is
quite complex. This section approaches the analysis through a series
of examples,3 5 7 based on the income tax systems of three statesFlorida, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. Florida has no individual income
tax. In Pennsylvania, the corporate income tax base conforms to the
ftderal base and the individual income tax is computed independently of the federal base. The corporate and individual income tax
bases of Ohio conform to the federal base.35 8 Special state constitutional considerations in New York, 151 whose tax system is similar to
federal level and by the other states is the dividend deduction or corporate tax repeal method.
Nonetheless, even in these situations, the states not adopting integration will need rules for

determining basis.
352. See, e.g., McKessy, supra note 7, at 378. Under certain methods, states that reject
integration will not have this problem. See note 278 and accompanying text supra.

353. See notes 255-58, 276-79 and accompanying text supra.
354. See note 257 and accompanying text supra.
355. See notes 255-58 and accompanying text supra
356. See notes 282-86 and accompanying text supra.
357. These examples are generally not numerical, but more closely resemble a series of
fact patterns.
358. See notes 181, 191 and accompanying text supra The income tax systems in Illinois
and New York are similar to the Ohio system. If the differences significantly affect the analysis
of the fact patterns in this section, they will be noted.
359. The New York Constitution provides as follows:
Moneys,... securities and other intangible personal property within the state not
employed in carrying on any business therein by the owner shall be deemed to be
located in the domicile of the owner for purposes of taxation... . Intangible per-

that of Ohio, are discussed when relevant to the analysis of the Ohiotype system.
The examples fall into four categories, 360 each of which focuses
on the responses of the primary state in light of the actions of the
secondary state. 36 ' Each category is based on variations of the residence of the corporation and that of its shareholders. 362 The first
category is a corporation resident in the primary state with shareholders who are residents of the secondary state. The second category is a corporation resident in both the primary and secondary
states, 363 and whose shareholders are residents of the secondary
state. The third category is a corporation resident in the secondary
state with shareholders who are residents of the primary state. 364
The fourth category is a corporation resident in both the primary
and secondary states and whose shareholders are residents of the primary state.3 65
The analysis requires several assumptions. First, if a state
adopts integration, it adopts the method adopted at the federal level.
Second, there are no shareholders that are corporations. Although
this assumption ignores, to a degree, the realities of the situation, it
prevents the analysis from becoming so complicated that it hinders
useful examination of the issues. Third, the analysis assumes that
the method used by each state to allocate or apportion corporate income among the states is one that avoids multiple taxation.3 66 This
sonal property shall not be taxed ad valorem nor shall any excise tax be levied solely
because of the ownership or possession thereof.
N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 3.
360. A fifth category is the state in isolation, ie., when the corporation and its shareholders are residents of the primary state. See notes 230-329 and accompanying text supra:
361. These four categories, the six methods of integration, the three state income tax systems examined, and the three basic reactions of each state (adoption, rejection, and inaction),
form the basis for developing the permutations of fact patterns analyzed in this section.
362. See notes 178-79 and accompanying text supra. For purposes of simplicity, this section does not analyze situations in which some of the shareholders are residents of one state
and other shareholders are residents of another state. To analyze this situation, it is necessary
to blend together in appropriate proportions the analyses of two or more relevant fact patterns.
363. As the definition of "resident" used in this article in relation to corporations indicates, this occurs ifthe corporation does business in both states. See note 178 and accompanying text jupra.
364. Although this category is a reversal of the first category, the point of view of the
primary state-the state which is analyzed in each category-changes depending on whether
its resident is a corporation or shareholder. In reality, a particular state would need to examine each category since all four situations exist simultaneously. See note 365 and accompanying text infra
365. There are limitations to an analysis based on these four categories because each state
faces a combination of all four situations. Ohio, for example, has resident corporations with
Illinois shareholders; resident individuals owning stock in Illinois corporations; corporations
that do business in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois that have shareholders who are residents of
Ohio and Illinois, and so on. The analysis in this section can be adapted to these very complex
situations by blending together in appropriate proportions the analyses of two or more relevant
fact patterns.
366. For informative background analyses of the multiple taxation problem of multistate
corporations, see Hellerstein, Recent Developments in State Tax Apportionment and the Circum-

assumption also ignores reality but, like the prior assumption, it prevents undue complication. 367 The final assumption is that individuals who are nonresidents of a state have no income in or relationship
with that state, other than their ownership of stock in a corporation
resident in that state.
This chapter analyzes the actions that states can take in response to the adoption of integration at the federal level and also
tests the proposition of the Carter Commission that uncoordinated
decision-making by the Canadian provinces on income tax integration would cause "an unsatisfactory state of affairs[,]. . . an endless
debate about the rights
and duties of. . .provinces[, and] an admin' 368
istrative nightmare.

B. Full Integration
1. CorporationResident in Primary State And Its Shareholders
Residents of Secondary State
(a) Primarystate does nothing.-If full integration is adopted
at the federal level and the primary state--the state in which the
corporation is resident--does nothing in response to the adoption of
full integration, the state taxable income of the corporation will virtually vanish. The effect on the corporation is the same as it is if the
corporation and its shareholders were residents of the primary state:
state corporate taxable income will be zero unless there are adjustments to federal corporate taxable income that apply in the case.369
If full integration is adopted at the federal level, inaction by the
primary state affects the income tax treatment of nonresident shareholders in various ways. In Florida and Pennsylvania, the nonresident shareholders would not be taxed.37 0 This result does not differ
from the result under current federal and state income tax law. In
Ohio, however, the nonresident shareholders will be required to include in taxable income that portion of their federal taxable incomes
that is properly allocable to Ohio.37 ' Ohio's statutory provisions for
allocating the income of a nonresident do not include rules for allocating distributive shares of corporate net income. Arguably, the
distributive share is business income because it arises from transacseription of Unitary Business, 21 NAT'L TAx J. 487 (1968); Note, Developments in the Law.Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARV. L. REv. 953 (1962).

367. Problems arising in the area of integration that are caused by multiple taxation would
be eliminated if multiple taxation is eliminated. This article does not address the elimination
of multiple taxation.
368. Royal Commission on Taxation, 6 Report 197 (Ottawa 1966). See note 155 and accompanying text supr,
369. See notes 184-87 and accompanying text supra,
370. See notes 189, 207 and accompanying text supra.
371. Osno REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5747.01(A), 5747.05(A), 5747.05(B) (Page 1973 & Supp.
1975).

tions and activities in the regular course of business;3 72 therefore, it
should be apportioned under the three-factor formula.3 73 In this
case, the distributive share would be apportioned entirely to Ohio.3 74
The alternative argument-that the distributive share is a dividend
and thus should not be allocated to Ohio 37 5-is not as persuasive
since the distributive share includes undistributed corporate net income. 376 In either case, Ohio will need to clarify the matter by
amending its tax law.3 77
(b) Primary state rejects integration.-If full integration is

adopted at the federal level and the primary state rejects integration,3 78 the tax treatment of the resident corporation and its nonresi-

by the primary state will continue as under current
dent shareholders
9
law.

37

(c) Primarystate adopts integration--Ohioasprimarystate.-If

full integration is adopted both at the federal level and in Ohio, an
interesting constitutional question arises concerning the treatment of
the nonresident shareholder.3 8s The issue is whether Ohio may tax
nonresident shareholders on their shares of the net income of the
Ohio corporation without violating the commerce or due process
clauses of the federal constitution.3 8 ' The commerce clause prohibits
states from imposing a tax that impedes interstate commerce.3 82 The

shift of the tax from the corporation to its nonresident shareholders
probably would not impede interstate commerce because that shift
impair the ability of the shareholders or corporation to
would not
38 3
function.

372. Id § 5747.01(B).
373. Id § 5747.21.
374. This result is based on the assumption that the corporation is resident in Ohio.
375. OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 5747.20(B)(5) (Page Supp. 1975).
376. This is especially true if few or no dividends have been distributed by the
corporation.
377. States that require nonresident shareholders of Subchapter S corporations to include
in taxable income all or a portion of their distributive shares of the corporate net income, see
notes 523-31 and accompanying text infra, can resolve the issue by analogy more easily than
Ohio. See notes 395-405 and accompanying text in-fra
378. See notes 290-96 and accompanying text supra.
379. The corporation might transfer its business to the secondary state if that state adopts
income tax integration. Of course, nontax factors may have required the nonresident shareholders to do business in the primary state and in corporate form. If the corporate income tax
burden is sufficiently great, however, integration might become a principal factor.
380. In New York, full integration might not be possible without a state constitutional
amendment. See notes 263-72 and accompanying text supra If the constitution is so amended
or if Garlin v. Murphy, 51 Misc. 2d 477, 273 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1966), is extended to apply to full
integration, the textual material concerning Ohio is relevant to New York.
381. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
382. See Hellerstein, supra note 366; Note, supra note 366.
383. Unless the corporation withholds, see notes 24-25 and accompanying text supra, taxpayers might argue that the lack of shareholder liquidity impedes their investment in interstate
commerce. This argument is weak, however, since many shareholders will not have liquidity
problems. From an economic standpoint, full integration does not change the position of the

The due process clause prevents a state from enforcing a tax
beyond its jurisdiction and from imposing a tax on persons or things
with only tangential relationships to the state.384 The due process
limitation is also unlikely to prevent the imposition of an Ohio income tax on the shares of the corporate net income that are attributable to nonresident shareholders. A jurisdictional basis for taxation
of income of a nonresident clearly exists if the source of that income 38 5 is from within that state, whether the income arises by virtue
of business situs or business activities.386 Although the corporation,
not the nonresident shareholders, has the property and activities in
Ohio that create the jurisdictional basis for taxation, it is difficult to
argue that this difference is sufficient to remove jurisdiction to tax
since no successful constitutional objections have been sustained
against state tax laws that tax nonresident beneficiaries of a resident
trust or estate,3 87 nonresident limited partners in a resident limited
partnership,388 or nonresident shareholders of a resident Subchapter
S corporation. 389 Thus, Ohio will require nonresident shareholders
to file income tax returns and pay tax on their shares of the net income of the corporation.390
Under full integration, the income tax treatment by Ohio of the
nonresident shareholders raises some problems for the state in which
the shareholders are resident, since the need may arise for a tax
credit for taxes paid to Ohio.39 '
(d) Primary state adopts integration--Pennsylvaniaas primary
state.-If full integration is adopted both at the federal level and in
shareholders because they receive the same or greater after-tax income. The Supreme Court,
however, does not give great weight to that aspect of the problem. See Note, supra note 366, at
956. Finally, to the extent that the proponents of income tax integration are correct in their
assertion that it will help the national economy, full integration should stimulate interstate
commerce.

384. See Note, supra note 366, at 961-62 & n.37.
385. This article does not discuss whether undistributed corporate net income is income
realized within the constitutional meaning of realization set forth in Eisner v. MacComber, 252
U.S. 189 (1920). See Gabinet & Coffey, supra note I.
386. See Note, supra note 366.
387. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5747.23 (Page 1973 & Supp. 1975).
388: See, e.g., Chapman v. Browne, 268 App. Div. 806, 48 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1944). The
argument that a partnership is a nonentity and the partner is the actual taxpayer is weak when
one considers the true relationship of a limited partner to a limited partnership.
389. See, e.g., Isaacson v. Iowa State Tax Comm'n, 183 N.W.2d 693 (Iowa 1971). The
elective nature of the Subchapter S corporation should not be of much significance to the
jurisdiction problem because the election is a federal election and should not be considered the
basis for current state taxation of nonresident shareholders of Subchapter S corporations.
390. The Ohio provision that permits a partnership under certain circumstances to file a
single return on behalf of its nonresident partners provides an approach to solving certain
administrative problems. See note 81 and accompanying text supra; notes 521-32 and accompanying text infra
391. This question is explored more fully in connection with the third category, in which
the shareholders are resident in the primary state and the corporation is resident in the secondary state. See notes 407-24 and accompanying text infra.

Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania must resolve the same questions as
Ohio. The inability of a partner in Pennsylvania to take into account
distributive shares of partnership losses, other than to offset partnership gains, however, is an interesting gloss on the problem. 392 The
nonresident shareholder, like the nonresident partner, will not be
permitted to use a distributive share of a corporate loss to offset compensation, interest, or other income received from the corporation.
It does not appear, however, that the shareholder would be in any
worse a position than under current law.
(e) Primary state adopts integration-Florida as primary
state.-Although integration effectively exists in Florida because
shareholders are not taxed, Florida might decide to follow the federal system and transfer the imposition of the income tax from the
corporation to its shareholders. The shareholder tax would resemble
a partial income tax. Florida would then encounter the same questions as Ohio. If, on the other hand, Florida adopts integration by
maintaining its current income tax system, neither resident nor nonresident shareholders would be subject to income tax.
2. CorporationResident in Primary and Secondary States And Its
ShareholdersResident in Secondary State
(a) Primarystate does nothing.-If full integration is adopted
at the federal level and the primary state-one of two states in which
the corporation is resident-does nothing in response to the adoption
of full integration, the outcome will be the same as if the corporation
were resident only in the primary state. The federal constitution,
however, does not permit the primary state to impose a tax on the
nonresident shareholders' portion of the distributive share that is apportionable to the secondary state. Thus, the interpretation
problems regarding allocation of distributive shares393 must be resolved in a manner that is consistent with those constitutional
limitations.
(b) Primary state rejects integration.-If full integration is
adopted at the federal level and the primary state rejects integration,
the tax treatment of the corporation and its nonresident shareholders
394
by the primary state will continue as under current law.
(c) Primary state adopts integration.-If full integration is
adopted both at the federal level and in the primary state, a question
392.
393.
394.

See note 83 supra
See notes 372-77 and accompanying text supra.
See note 379 supra

arises in addition to those that arise when the corporation is resident
only in the primary state. The question involves the manner in
which the primary state determines the portion of the distributive
share of the nonresident shareholder that is allocable to the primary
state.39 5 The primary state must determine whether it will treat the
distributive share of the nonresident shareholder as a dividend, 396 as
business income,3 97 or as the distributive
share of a nonresident part398

ner of a resident partnership.

Very few clues exist in the current treatment of entities taxed at
the shareholder level 399 to suggest what the primary state would decide. Since Ohio and Pennsylvania treat Subchapter S corporations
as they do any other corporation, no analogy can be drawn for those
states. New York does not tax nonresident shareholders of Subchapter S corporations. This approach resembles its tax treatment of
dividends received by nonresidents from resident corporations, 4°°
but it is not a beneficial approach under full integration because of
potential revenue loss.40' Such an approach would, however, be ad-

ministratively acceptable. Certain states that tax nonresident shareholders of Subchapter S corporations 4° z resolve the problem by
requiring the nonresident shareholder to pay tax on the part of the
distributive share derived from sources within the state. °3
Since full integration is conceptually a partnership approach to
the taxation of corporations, Ohio is likely to determine the portion
of the distributive share of the nonresident shareholder that is properly allocable to Ohio as it determines the allocation of the distributive share of a nonresidentpartner. Alternatively, Ohio could follow
the approach of the states that require nonresident shareholders of
Subchapter S corporations to include in state taxable income the
portion of their distributive shares that are allocable to the state.
The partnership treatment differs from the treatment of the distribu395. This issue is analogous to the one that arises if the primary state does nothing. See
notes 372-77 and accompanying text supra The difference is that in the situation described in
the text the state has a choice. In the situation that arises if the primary state does nothing, the
issue is resolved by existing state law.
396. See, e.g., note 375 and accompanying text supra
397. See, e.g., notes 372-73 and accompanying text supra
398. See notes 67-73, 74-76, 86-87 and accompanying text supra
399. See notes 64-145 and accompanying text supra
400. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 3-301(c)(2)(A) (Smith-Hurd 1974); PA. TAX REG.
§ 301(k)-1(4)(b), I PA. STATE TAX REP. (CCH) 1 19-518.
401. The interstate revenue loss that a state incurs if it follows the federal Subchapter S
election is relatively small, because only a small percentage of corporations are Subchapter S
corporations, and most of those are intrastate enterprises. For example, in 1977, of the
2,241,317 federal income tax returns filed by corporations, only 429,187 (19.1%) were filed by
Subchapter S corporations. Of the $4.1 trillion in receipts reported by corporations, only
$163.7 billibn (3.9%) were received by Subehapter S corporations. IRS- 1977 CORPORATION
INCOME TAX STATISTICS, supra note 187 at 9, 23.
402. See notes 521-31 and accompanying text in9,a
403. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 143.181(5) (Vernon 1976).

tive share entirely as business income in only one respect. Under the
partnership approach, the items of corporate net income that are
subject to specific allocation rules are allocated in the hands of the
shareholders under those rules, and not as business income at the
corporate level."' The result under the partnership approach is the
same as when the entire corporate income is both allocated and
ap4 5
portioned, and not merely apportioned, at the corporate level. 0
When shareholders are nonresidents of Florida and the corporation is a resident of Florida and is also present in another state, the
analysis is the same as if the corporation were a resident only of
Florida.'
If Florida institutes a partial shareholder income tax, it
will encounter the same questions as Ohio and Pennsylvania. If
Florida continues its present system, neither nonresident shareholders nor resident shareholders will be subject to income tax.
3. CorporationResident in Secondary State And Its Shareholders
Resident in PrimaryState
(a) Primarystate does nothing.-If full integration is adopted
at the federal level and the primary state--the state in which the
shareholders are resident-does nothing in response to the adoption
of full integration, the effect of full integration depends not only on
the particularities of the state tax system, but also on the response of
the secondary state to full integration.
(b) Primaryand secondary states do nothing-Ohio asprimary
state.-If Ohio is the primary state and both it and the secondary
state do nothing, the effect of full integration depends on the identity
of the secondary state. If the secondary state is Florida or Pennsylvania, the residents of Ohio who are shareholders in the Florida
or Pennsylvania corporation will not be taxed by Florida or Pennsylvania, but they will include their distributive shares of the net income of the Florida or Pennsylvania corporation in their Ohio
individual incomes. This poses no problems for Ohio in addition to
those already discussed.4 7
The secondary state may be like Illinois, which has an income
tax system similar to the Ohio system. In this case, Illinois might or
might not tax Ohio residents who are shareholders in the Illinois corporation on their distributive shares of the net income of the corporation. Taxation is determined by the interpretation of the
provisions of the Illinois or Ohio tax law relating to the allocation of
404.
405.
406.
407.

See
See
See
See

notes 372-73 and accompanying text supra
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5747.20 (Page Supp. 1975).
note 393 and accompanying text supra,
notes 230-89, 369-406 and accompanying text supra.

these distributive shares of nonresidents. 40 8 No problem arises if the
net effect of the interpretation is that Illinois does not tax the distributive shares. Alternatively, if Illinois does tax those distributive
shares, Ohio shareholders can claim a credit against their Ohio income taxes for the tax imposed by Illinois, 40 9 and revenues shift from
Ohio to Illinois.
(c) Primary and secondary state do nothing-Pennsylvania as
primary state.-If both Pennsylvania, as the primary state, and the
secondary state do nothing, the identity of the secondary state determines the effect of full integration. If the secondary state is Florida
or a state with an income tax system similar to that in Pennsylvania,
such as North Carolina, the residents of Pennsylvania who are shareholders in the Florida or North Carolina corporation will not be
taxed by Florida or North Carolina. These shareholders will be required to include only dividends received from the corporation in
their Pennsylvania individual incomes, 4 1° a procedure that does not
differ from the current situation.
If the secondary state is Ohio, the result is the same as if Ohio
were the primary state, 41 ' except that the Pennsylvania individual
incomes of the shareholders include only the dividends paid by the
corporation and the tax credit is limited to the Ohio income tax attributable to those dividends.41 ' Thus, the undistributed portion of
the distributive net income of the corporation will be taxed only by
Ohio. When it is later distributed as a dividend, it will be included
in Pennsylvania individual income. Since the shareholder at that
time should be able to claim a credit for the Ohio income tax imposed on the dividend,4 13 however, revenue shifts from Pennsylvania
to Ohio.
(d) Primaryandsecondary state do nothing--oridaasprimary
state.-If neither Florida, as the primary state, nor the secondary
state do anything, the effect of full integration will vary. If inaction
by the secondary state does not result in taxation by that state of the
distributive shares of corporate net income of nonresident shareholders,4 1 4 there will be no effect. If the inaction by the secondary state
results in taxation by that state of nonresident shareholders' divi408.
409.
410.
411.

See notes 372-77 and accompanying text supra
See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5747.05(B) (Page 1973).
See 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7303(a)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1977).
See notes 408-09 and accompanying text supra.
412. See 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7314 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
413. Problems will arise in determining which portion of the corporate net income taxed
by Ohio is distributed as a dividend. Rules similar to those for determining earnings and
profits at the federal level might be needed. See I.R.C. §§ 312, 316. A very narrow interpretation of the Pennsylvania tax law providing credits for taxes paid to other states would deny any
credit to the shareholders.
414. This would occur in a state with an income tax system similar to the systems in
Florida or Pennsylvania, or a state with an income tax system similar to the system in Ohio, if

dends and undistributed corporate net income,4 15 Florida shareholders will pay individual income tax to the secondary state without
having a Florida income tax liability against which to credit that tax.
(e) Primarystate does nothing--secondary state rejects integration.-If the secondary state rejects full integration, it will not tax
the primary state shareholders on their interests in the secondary
state corporation. This result is no different than under current law.
(t) Primary state does nothing-secondarystate adopts integration.-If the secondary state adopts full integration,41 6 the effects on
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Florida, and their resident shareholders are the
same as if those three states were primary states, with Ohio as the
secondary state that does nothing in response to full integration, but
interprets its tax laws concerning allocation of the distributive net
income attributable to a nonresident shareholder such that it requires a nonresident shareholder to pay an Ohio income tax on that
distributive share.4 17
(g) Primary state rejects integration.-If full integration is
adopted at the federal level and the primary state--the state in which
the shareholders are resident-rejects full integration, the effect depends on the response of the secondary state to full integration. If
the secondary state, by action or inaction, does not tax the undistributed net income attributable to a nonresident shareholder,41 8 no effect will occur. The tax results will be the same as under current law.
If the secondary state taxes the full distributive share of the corporate net income attributable to a nonresident shareholder, 41 9 a credit
problem arises. The primary state generally permits a credit against
its income tax only for taxes paid to another state on income also
taxed by the primary state.42 ° The primary state shareholders, therefore, will be unable to claim a credit for the taxes paid to the secondary state on the undistributed portion of their distributive shares of
the corporate net income until that portion of the income is distribthe state interprets its allocation provisions to treat the distributive share of corporate net income as a dividend.
415. This would occur in a state with an income tax system similar to the Ohio system if

the state interprets its allocation provisions to treat the distributive share of corporate net income as business income.
416. An exception to this example would be Florida "adopting" integration by doing
nothing in response to the adoption of integration at the federal level. See note 393 and accompanying text supra,
417. See notes 409, 411-13, 415 and accompanying text supra.
418. This would occur in a state that rejects integration or a state described in note 414
supra.
419. An example would be a state that adopts integration. But see notes 415 & 416 supra
420. See, e.g., 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7314 (Purdon Supp. 1977).

uted as a dividend.4 21

(h) Primary state adopts integration.-If full integration is
adopted at the federal level and the primary state adopts full integration,422 the effect is determined by the response of the secondary
state to full integration. If the secondary state does not tax the undistributed net income attributable to a nonresident shareholder,423
no effect occurs since the tax results will be the same as under current law. If the secondary state taxes the full distributive share of the
corporate net income attributable to the nonresident shareholder,424
the primary state shareholders will claim a credit against their primary state income tax liabilities for the income taxes paid to the secondary state on their distributive shares of the corporate net income.
4. Corporation Resident in Primary and Secondary States And
Its Shareholders Resident in Primary State.-Adoption of full integration at the federal level complicates the issue that arises when the
corporation is a resident only in the secondary state with the question of how to allocate and apportion the corporate income. A series
of issues also arises concerning the availability or measure of tax
credits for income taxes paid to other states.
If both the primary and secondary states do not tax the shareholders on the undistributed net income of the corporation,425 the
tax results and allocation problems will be no different than under
current law.
If the secondary state426 does not tax shareholders on the undis4 27
tributed net income of the corporation, but the primary state does,
a problem arises. The primary state will tax shareholders who are
residents in the primary state on their shares of the entire net income
of the corporation.428 If, however, the secondary state taxes the portion of the corporation's net income properly allocable to the secondary state,42 9 the shareholders in the primary state will be unable to
claim that tax as a credit against their primary state income tax liabilities. To this extent, a portion of the net income of the corporation
will be subject to double taxation.430 If the secondary state, by its
421. See notes 411-13 supra for a similar fact pattern.
422. But see note 416 supra
423. See note 418 supra
424. See note 419 supra.
425. See note 418 supra
426. Id An analysis based on these four categories is limited because each state encounters a combination of all four.
427. See note 419 supra
428. A state has jurisdiction to tax its residents on all income no matter what the source.
429. Allocation problems identical to those under current law exist.
430. If the primary state is concerned with this result, it can adopt a pass-through credit
system. See I.R.C. § 902.

inaction, taxes neither the corporation nor its shareholders on the
portion of the corporate net income properly allocable to the secondary state, no special problems are created for the primary state.43 1
An interesting issue arises if the primary state 43 2 does not tax
shareholders on the undistributed net income of the corporation
while the secondary state does. 33 The secondary state will tax the
shareholders who are residents in the primary state on the portion of
their shares of the corporate net income that is properly allocable to
the secondary state.43 4 If, however, the primary state, by its inaction,43 5 taxes neither the corporation nor its shareholders on corporate net income, the shareholders resident in the primary state will
be unable to claim a credit for the income taxes they pay to the secondary state. This results from a limitation in most state tax laws
permitting the credit only for income taxed in both states.4 3 6 The
result is undesirable from the perspective of the primary state because under current law, only the primary state would tax the shareholders' portions of the corporate income distributed as dividends.4 37
If the primary state taxes the portion of the corporation's net income
properly allocable to the primary state, 438 no problem arises because
each state taxes the income properly allocable to it, one in the hands
of the corporation and the other in the hands of the shareholders.
Two problems arise if the primary state also taxes resident
shareholders on dividends received from the corporation. One is the
double taxation of the portion of corporate net income allocable to
the primary state. This result, however, is not a problem from the
perspective of the primary state because it is an intended result. The
second problem is a complication in the computation of the credit
for income taxes paid to other states. Since the shareholders resident
in the primary state are taxed on all dividends from the corporation,43 9 they will seek a credit for the taxes paid to the secondary
state on the portion of the corporate net income allocable to the secondary state.'
The dilemma is whether the distributive share taxed
by the secondary state is income also subject to taxation by the primary state within the meaning of the credit provision."' The situa431.
432.
433.
434.

The double taxation problem does not exist in this situation.
See note 418 supra
See note 419 supra
See also notes 394-400 and accompanying text supra

435.

An example would be a state with an income tax system similar to that in Florida or

Pennsylvania.
436. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5747.05(B)(1) (Page 1973).
437. Under current law, states do not tax dividends paid to nonresidents. Dividends are
therefore taxed by the home state of the shareholders. See note 400 supra
438. See note 429 supra
439. See note 428 supra
440. See note 419 and accompanying text supra.
441. See note 436 and accompanying text supra.

tion is further complicated if the dividend is paid in a taxable year
subsequent to the year in which the secondary state taxes the corporate net income from which it is paid. A narrow interpretation of the
tax credit provision would deny the credit and cause double taxation
of the corporate net income allocable to the secondary state." 2 A
broader interpretation of the tax credit provision would permit the
credit.
If both the primary and secondary states tax shareholders with
respect to distributed and undistributed net income of the corporation," 3 no serious problem arises. The primary state will tax resident shareholders on their shares of the entire corporate net
income, 4 " but will allow a tax credit for the taxes paid by the shareholders to the secondary state on their shares of the corporate net
income properly allocable to the secondary state. 44 5
C. Dividend Credit
L

Corporation Resident in Primary State And Its Shareholders
Residents of Secondary State.

(a) Primarystate does nothing.-If the dividend credit method
of integration is adopted at the federal level and the primary statethe state in which the corporation is resident-does nothing in response, several issues arise.
If the primary state is Ohio, the nonresident shareholder is not
required to include the dividend in Ohio taxable income." 6 A question arises, however, on the allocation of the federal corporate income tax attributable to the dividend that the shareholder has
included in federal taxable income. 447 If the state tax law is interpreted to allocate the federal corporate income tax to sources outside
Ohio, the result is no different than under current law. 448 A contrary
interpretation results if Ohio taxes the nonresident shareholder on
the federal corporate income tax included in income. This raises
problems for the secondary state, which are discussed in connection
with the third category, in which the shareholders are residents of
the primary state.4 9
442. The primary state might intend this result. It impedes, however, the attempt of the
secondary state to eliminate double taxation of corporate earnings distributed as dividends.
443. See notes 422-24 and accompanying text supra for an illustrative case.
444. See note 428 jupra
445. See notes 424-25 and accompanying text supra
446. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5747.20(B)(4) (Page Supp. 1975).
447. See notes 206-08 and accompanying text supra The issue is moot if the federal
"gross-up" provisions are placed in section 78 of the Internal Revenue Code and the state tax
law presently excludes the section 78 "gross-up" from state taxable income. See note 203
supra

448.
449.

See note 437 supra
See notes 469-89 and accompanying text bnfra.

With Pennsylvania as the primary state, the result is the same as
under present law because the nonresident shareholder is not re45 0
quired to include the dividend in Pennsylvania taxable income.
The issue concerning the federal corporate income tax included in
shareholder incomedoes not arise because Pennsylvania taxable income is computed independently of the federal base.
If the primary state is Florida, no problems arise because Florida has no individual income tax.
(b) Primary state rejects integration.-Adoption of the dividend credit method of integration at the federal level and the primary state's rejection of integration causes no change in the taxation
of the resident corporation and its nonresident shareholders. Their
tax treatment will continue as under current law in the primary
state.45 l
(c) Primary state adopts integration.-Adoption of the dividend credit method of integration at the federal level and in the primary state creates an interesting constitutional question concerning
the treatment of the nonresident shareholder. 4 2 The issue is
whether primary state taxation of nonresident shareholders with respect to dividends received from corporations resident in the primary
state violates the commerce and due process clauses of the federal
constitution.45 3 Although contrary arguments can be advanced,45 4
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. .JC.
Penney Co. 455 and InternationalHarvester Co. v. Wisconsin Department of Taxation45 6 indicate that the primary state may tax nonresident shareholders on dividends attributable to corporate net income

arising from sources within the primary state. 45 7 The J C. Penney
450. See note 400 supra.
451. See note 379 supra
452. In New York, the constitution might prevent taxation of the nonresident shareholder.
See Letter from James H. Tully, Jr., Commissioner of Taxation and Finance, State of New
York, to James E. Maule (January 11, 1978) at 4 (on file at the Dickinson School of Law),
concerning section 3 of article XVI of the New York Constitution, the relevant text of which
appears in note 359 supra
453. See notes 381-82, 384 and accompanying text supra
454. Penniman & Heller, State Income Tax Administration 27 (1959) (no authority cited).
But see Note, Multistate Taxation of PersonalIncome, 11l U. PA. L. REv.974 (1963).
455. 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
456. 322 U.S. 435 (1944).
457. The Court in International larvester stated,
In taxing such distributions [of corporate earnings], Wisconsin may impose the burden of the tax either upon the corporation or upon the stockholders who derive the
ultimate benefit from the corporation's Wisconsin activities. Personal presence
within the state of the stockholder-taxpayers is not essential to the constitutional levy
of a tax taken out of so much of the corporation's Wisconsin earnings as is distributed
to them. A state may tax such part of the income of a non-resident as is fairly attributable either to property located in the state or to events or transactions which, occurring there, are subject to state regulation and which are within the protection of the
state and entitled to the numerous other benefits which it confers. And the privilege

and InternationalHarvester decisions concerned the same state tax
on the corporation, which was measured as a percentage of dividends paid. In both cases, the Supreme Court reiterated the rationale of Wisconsin Gas & Electric Co. v. UnitedStates:4 5 "[W]here the
earnings of a Wisconsin corporation doing business solely in Wisconsin are the source of the dividends, the State's power to tax their
transfer and impose that tax upon the stockholder cannot be
doubted."45 9

Since the constitutional questions should be resolved in favor of
the primary state, that state must decide whether it will continue
nontaxation of nonresident shareholders on the dividends from the
primary state corporation, or whether it will tax the nonresident
shareholder and permit a credit for the state corporate income tax
attributable to the dividend.4 6° The latter approach alleviates double
taxation of the corporate net income. The former approach also allieviates double taxation unless the secondary state taxes the nonresi-

dent shareholders on the dividend from the primary state
corporation without providing a credit."'
2.

CorporationResident in Primaryand Secondary States And Its
ShareholdersResident in Secondary State

(a) Primarystate does nothing.-If the dividend credit method
of integration is adopted at the federal level and the primary state-

one of two states in which the corporation is resident--does nothing
in response, the issues presented are the same as in the situations in

which the corporation is resident in the primary, but not secondary,
state.4' 2
(b)

Primary state rejects integration.-Ifthe federal govern-

ment adopts the dividend credit method of integration and the priof receiving dividends derived from corporate activities within the state can have no
greater immunity than the privilege of receiving any other income from sources located there.
We think that Wisconsin may constitutionally tax the Wisconsin earnings distributed as dividends to the stockholders.
322 U.S. at 441-42.
458. 322 U.S. 526 (1944).
459. Id at 530-31. All three decisions might be distinguishable because the corporation,
not the shareholders, was required to file a return and remit the tax withheld from the distributed dividends. Dicta in the cases indicate that such a distinction is tenuous. Moreover, states
might determine that it is administratively advantageous to require corporations to withhold
under a dividend credit method of integration.
460. In either event, Ohio must take steps to remove from the taxable income of the shareholders the federal corporate taxable income otherwise included therein. See notes 301-02 and
accompanying text supra
461. No problem occurs if the secondary state is Florida. The credit might not be of much
use to the shareholders if their income tax liabilities to the primary state are less than their
income tax liabilities to the secondary state.
462. See notes 446-50 and accompanying text supra.

mary state proceeds to reject integration, the tax treatment of the
corporation and its nonresident shareholders from the perspective of
the primary state will continue as under current law. 63
(c) Primary state adopts integration.-If the dividend credit
method of integration is adopted both at the federal level and in the
primary state, several questions arise in addition to the issues concerning treatment of the nonresident shareholder when the corporation is resident in the primary, but not secondary, state. The issues
arise if the primary state decides to tax the nonresident shareholder
on the dividend from the corporation and permit a credit for the
state corporate income tax attributable to the dividend. First, the
primary state must decide how it will determine the portion of the
dividend that is attributable to corporate net income from sources
within the primary state. 4" Presumably, the allocation would conform to the allocation used by the corporation in determining its income tax liability to the primary state, 465 although this approach is
not without complications. ' 6 Second, the primary state must decide
how it will determine the portion of state corporate income tax that
is attributable to the dividend paid to the nonresident shareholder
and subject to income taxation by the primary state." 7 In all likelihood, the state corporate income tax included in the income of the
nonresident shareholder, and subsequently allowed as a credit, will
be the tax paid on the income of the corporation from which the
dividend taxed by the state is paid.4"
3. CorporationResident in Secondary State andIts Shareholders
Resident in Primary State
(a) Primary state does nothing.-If the federal government
adopts the dividend credit method of integration and the primary
463. See note 379 supra

464. The federal constitution limits taxation by the primary state of the portion of the
corporate net income attributable to income from sources within the secondary state. See text
accompanying note 393 supra.

465.

The formula might be as follows:

Portion of
Corporate net income from
dividend taxed - Dividend x sources within primary state
by primary
state
Total corporate net income
466. If more than one taxable year is involved there must be a complicated tracing of
sources of corporate net income and application of the formula in note 465 supra to each
particular year. See note 413 upra.
467. The amount of state corporate income tax so determined is included in the state
taxable income of the nonresident shareholder and allowed as a credit against the tax liability
of the shareholder.
468. See notes 465-66 supra Special rules would be needed to determine the state corporate income tax attributable to the dividend if the dividend is paid from the earnings of more
than one taxable year.

state does nothing in response, the effect of integration depends not
only on the identity of the state, but on the response of the secondary
state to the dividend credit method of integration.
(b) Primaryand secondary states do nothing-Ohio as primary

state.-If both Ohio, as the primary state, and the secondary state do
nothing, the effect of the dividend credit method of integration depends on the identity of the secondary state. If the secondary state is
Florida, the residents of Ohio who are shareholders in the Florida
corporation will not be taxed by Florida, but will include the dividend and federal corporate income tax attributable to the dividend
in their Ohio individual incomes." 9 This does not pose any
problems for Ohio in addition to those already discussed. 70
If the secondary state is Pennsylvania, the residents of Ohio who
are shareholders in the Pennsylvania corporation will not be taxed
by Pennsylvania, and no special problems are caused for Ohio. If
the secondary state is a state with an income tax system similar to
Ohio's, such as Illinois, the residents of Ohio who are shareholders in
the Illinois corporation may or may not be taxed by Illinois on the
federal corporate income tax included in the income of the shareholders. 7 ' If Illinois does not tax the federal corporate income tax,
no problem arises. If Illinois taxes the federal corporate income tax,
however, the Ohio shareholders will claim a credit for the taxes paid
to Illinois if Ohio also taxes the federal corporate income tax. If
Ohio does not tax the federal tax, Ohio taxpayers do not claim a
credit,472 but they will pay income taxes to Illinois on ownership of
an Illinois corporation that they do not pay under current law.473
(c) Primary and secondary state do nothing-Pennsylvania or
Floridaas primary state.-If either Pennsylvania or Florida is the

primary state and neither the primary nor the secondary state responds, the effect of the dividend credit method of integration differs
from the effect under current law in one aspect. If the secondary
state is Ohio and it interprets its tax law to require the Pennsylvania
or Florida shareholders to pay Ohio income tax on the federal corporate income tax included in federal taxable income, Pennsylvania
shareholders will not be able to credit the Ohio tax against their
Pennsylvania tax liabilities. Florida shareholders will have no Florida income tax liability against which to credit that tax. Both Pennsylvania and Florida shareholders will, however, be paying income
469. See notes 205-08 and accompanying text supra
470. See notes 446-49 and accompanying text supra.
471. See notes 446-49 and accompanying text supra.
472. A state permits a credit only for income taxed both by it and by the state that imposes
the income tax. See note 420 and accompanying text supra
473. The tax is unintended and accidental and, for that reason, probably is not justifiable.

taxes to Ohio for ownership of an Ohio corporation. They do not
pay these taxes under current law.474
(d) PrimaryState does nothing-Secondarystate rejects integration.-The primary state shareholders will not be taxed on interests
in the secondary state corporation if the secondary state rejects the
dividend credit method. This result is the same as under current
law.
(e) Primarystate does nothing-Secondarystate adopts integration.- If the secondary state adopts the dividend credit method of
integration, the primary state and its resident shareholders are af-

fected in several ways. The primary state need not act if the secondary state decides not to tax nonresident shareholders' corporate
dividends.4 75 If the secondary state taxes nonresident shareholders'
dividends from the corporation, the effect depends on the identity of
the primary state.
If the primary state is Florida, the result is that resident share-

holders pay to the secondary state a tax that they do not pay under
current law.4 76

If the primary state is Pennsylvania, it must resolve a complicated tax credit issue. The tax credit that Pennsylvania residents can
claim is the portion of the tax paid to the secondary state on the

dividend.4 7 7 One aspect of the problem is that part of the secondary
state tax liability of the Pennsylvania shareholder involves the inclusion of the corporate state income tax liability in income. The second aspect of the problem concerns the allocation of the secondary
state dividend credit liability of the Pennsylvania shareholder on the
dividend to the secondary state.478
If the primary state is Ohio, it faces the same problems as Penn474. See note 473 supra.
475. See note 460 supra.
476. This does not occur if in the secondary state the state dividend credit of the shareholder exceeds the state income tax liability of the shareholder on the dividend and the state
dividend credit.
477. See note 420 and accompanying text supra
478. For example, assume the corporation has one shareholder and is taxed by the secondary state at a five percent rate. The corporation has $200 of income before federal tax liability, and thus pays $10 of state income tax. The corporation pays a $100 dividend to the
Pennsylvania shareholder. The secondary state taxes the Pennsylvania shareholder on $105
($100 plus $5 corporate tax attributable to dividend), at a rate of six percent for a tax liability
of $1.30 ($6.30 less $5 corporate tax). Pennsylvania taxes the shareholder on the $100 dividend. The issue is whether the credit should be $1.30 (actual tax paid to secondary state),
$6.00 (secondary state tax on the dividend ignoring dividend credit, i.e., 6% of $100), or $5.95
(the $6.00 tax less 100/105 of the $5.00 dividend credit). Presumably it should be $1.30, but
this is not an evident result. This ignores the fact that in the absence of the dividend credit
method of integration the secondary state would not have taxed the Pennsylvania shareholder.
In any event, Pennsylvania legislators and tax administrators probably will not appreciate
the complexity added to its tax law and forms as a result of the actions of another state.

sylvania, in addition to the question of whether the federal corporate
income tax included in Ohio taxable income of the shareholder is
subject to income taxation.4 7 9
0 Primary state rejects integration.-If the dividend credit
method of integration is adopted at the federal level and the primary
state-the state in which the shareholders are resident-rejects integration, the response of the secondary state determines the effect of
the dividend credit method of integration. If the secondary state
does not provide for a dividend credit method of integration, 48 0 the
tax results will be the same as under current law. If the secondary
state, by its inaction, taxes the federal corporate income tax included
in the federal taxable income of the shareholder, the effect will be the
same as when Ohio, as the secondary state, interprets its tax laws to
produce the result. 48 ' If the secondary state adopts a dividend credit
method of integration, the effect for Ohio and Pennsylvania is the
same as that described when Pennsylvania does nothing and the secondary state adopts a dividend credit method of integration.4 82
Since Florida does not have an individual income tax, these effects
will not occur in Florida, but the tax liabilities of its shareholders to
the secondary state will be altered.48 3
(g) Primary state adopts integration.-Adoption of the dividend credit method of integration at the federal level only by the
primary state can produce several results, depending upon the response of the secondary state. If the secondary state does not adopt a
dividend credit method of integration, 4 there is no effect on the
primary state unless the secondary state is Ohio and it taxes the federal corporate income tax included in the federal taxable income of
the shareholder.4 8 5 If the secondary state adopts a dividend credit
method of integration and decides to tax nonresident shareholders'
dividends,48 6 the result will be a complication of the state income tax
credit for taxes paid to another state. 8 7
479,

See notes 447-49 and accompanying text supra;

480. This would occur in states with income tax systems similar to those in Pennsylvania
or Florida.
481. See notes 471-74 and accompanying text supra There will be one simplification in
the fact pattern described at text accompanying note 473 supra, because one of the states with

an income tax system similar to Ohio's will not tax the federal corporate income tax attributable to the dividend and, thus, there will be no credit for taxes paid to another state.
482. See notes 477-78 and accompanying text supra.

483. Whether there is an increase or decrease depends on the relation of the income tax
rates of the corporation and the rates of its shareholders.
484.

An example would be a state that rejects integration or a state described in note 480

upra
485.
486.
487.

See notes 471-74 and accompanying text supra
See note 460 supra
See notes 477-78 and accompanying text supra

A second and more important effect of the adoption of a dividend credit method of integration by the primary state is a consequence of the fact that the corporation has no tax liability to the
primary state.48 8 The dividend, therefore, is included in the primary
state income of the shareholders as it is under current law, but there
is no state corporate income tax credit for the shareholders to claim
against their income tax liabilities to the primary state. 489 The primary state adopting the dividend credit method of integration must
rely on the secondary state to provide relief to the corporation in
situations falling within this category.
4. CorporationResident in Primaryand Secondary States And
Its Shareholders Resident in Primary State.-If the dividend credit
method of integration is adopted at the federal level, the effect in this
category is a compounding of two types of issues: the issues arising
when the corporation is resident only in the secondary state and the
issue of allocation and apportionment of corporate income. In most
situations in which the corporation is resident only in the secondary
state and the shareholders are resident in the primary state, little is
added by the fact that the corporation is subject to income taxation
by the primary state. The one exception is that the primary state
adopting the dividend credit method of integration will not face the
problem that arises if the corporation has no inome tax liability to
the primary state. The shareholders will include all or a portion of
the income tax liability of the corporation to the primary state in
their primary state taxable incomes and will be permitted to claim a
credit in that amount against their income tax liabilities to that state.
D.

Dividend Deduction

Adoption of a federal dividend deduction method of integration
would present the states with several problems. Regardless of its response to the adoption of the dividend deduction method of integration by the federal government, the primary state will not be
concerned with the response of the secondary state, because the dividend deduction method of integration affects only corporate income
tax.
If the primary state adopts the dividend deduction method of
integration, it must decide whether it should allow the deduction for
dividends paid to nonresident shareholders. 49 Although permitting
488. This is because the fact pattern involves a corporation that is not resident in and,
thus, not subject to taxation by the primary state. See note 178 and accompanying text supra
489. See Letter from James H. Tully, Jr., Commissioner of Taxation and Finance, State of
New York, to James E. Maule (January 11, 1978) at 4 (on fie at the Dickinson School of Law).
490. This problem is not unlike that encountered at the federal level regarding whether
nonresident alien shareholders should be eligible for income tax integration. See Comm. on
Corporations of the Tax Section of the N.Y. St. Bar A., supra note 1, at 47-48; Letter from

such a deduction produces a revenue loss because the nonresident
shareholders do not have a tax liability to the primary state, the proponents of integration point out that double taxation of corporate
earnings would not necessarily be completely eliminated if the de4" 9
duction for those dividends were denied. '
The primary state adopting the dividend deduction method of
integration will also need to provide a method for determining what
portion of the dividends paid by the corporation are allocable to the

primary state.4 92 Presumably, the deduction should be the same proportion of the dividends as the proportion of corporate taxable income before dividends and state income taxes allocable to the
primary state bears to the entire taxable income of the corporation
before dividends and state income taxes.4 9 3 The computation could

be more complex if the state adopts a precise approach by requiring
a tracing of the corporate taxable income from which dividends are
paid 49 4 and applies a separate proportion fraction to the taxable income from each taxable year.4 95
E.

DividendExclusion

If a dividend exclusion method of integration is adopted at the
federal level, the states face several issues. Primary states will not be
concerned from a technical standpoint with the response of the secJames H. Tully, Jr., Commissioner of Taxation and Finance, State of New York, to James E.
Maule (January 11, 1978) at 4 (on file at the Dickinson School of Law).
491. Proponents of income tax integration have not yet addressed this specific issue in the
state context, but this position is an almost inevitable result of their reasoning. See notes 4-6
and accompanying text supra A constitutional equal protection question might be raised by a
corporation whose shareholders are nonresidents. The state will emphasize that it taxes only
residents' dividends and that therefore its double taxation of corporate earnings, eliminated by
allowing a deduction for dividends distributed to resident shareholders, does not exist for dividends distributed to nonresident shareholders.
492. The issue arises only if the corporation is a resident in the secondary as well as the
primary state. The remainder of a full dividend deduction would be provided by the secondary state since it, and not the primary state, is responsible if double taxation occurs because of
its action or inaction. The federal government, by adopting the dividend deduction method of
integration, has determined that the cause of double taxation is the taxation at the corporate
level of distributed dividends.
The issue is analogous to that at the federal level concerning whether a deduction should
be permitted for dividends paid from tax-exempt income. See McLure, IntegrationofPersonal
and CorporateIncome Taxes." The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals,supra
note i, at 565.
493. The peculiar nature of the tax law or tax policy of a particular state might require the
use of an income figure from an earlier or later point in the computation of taxable income,
such as taxable income after state income taxes.
494. Special rules similar to those provided for computing earnings and profits would be
required. See note 413 supra.
495. The complexity can be illustrated by considering a corporation that in its first taxable
year does business only in the secondary state, pays no dividends, and has after-tax net income
of $100. In its second taxable year, the corporation does business in both the primary and the
secondary states, has no income from either state, but distributes a $50 dividend to its shareholders. The issue is whether the primary state should allow a dividend deduction in that
situation.

ondary state because the dividend exclusion method of integration
affects only individual income tax. This is not changed by either
adoption or rejection of a dividend exclusion method of integration.
From a policy standpoint, however, the primary state must be concerned with the response of the secondary state. If the secondary
state does not provide the exclusion for its residents who are shareholders in a primary state corporation,49 6 the goals of the primary
state are thwarted to that extent.4 97
A technical issue that arises regarding the dividend exclusion
method of integration is whether the primary state should permit the
exclusion of dividends attributable to income not taxed by the primary state. The adoption of such a rule would require complex rules
of attribution and special provisions for dividends paid in a year
other than that in which earned. 498 The primary state does not benefit, however, from adopting complex attribution rules that provide,
in effect, for a partial dividend exclusion. If the secondary state
taxes resident shareholders of the primary state on the portion of the
dividend attributable to corporate earnings from the secondary state,
which it is not likely to do,49 9 the primary state would permit its
resident shareholders to claim an income tax credit for those taxes.
Since the net effect of the credit is to remove that portion of the dividend from primary state taxable income, a partial denial of the exclusion would be counterproductive. Similarly, if the secondary
state does not tax the resident shareholder of the primary state on the
portion of the dividend attributable to corporate earnings from the
secondary state, the primary state, by excluding that portion from
the dividend exclusion, continues to impose double taxation on certain corporate income.
If the primary state has no individual income tax, it has no
problems because it has a dividend exclusion method of integration"°° already in effect. 5"'
496. Even if the secondary state rejects integration, it will continue, as it does under present law, to not tax primary state residents on dividends whether or not the corporation is
subject to income taxation by the secondary state. A constitutional equal protection question
could be raised by the nonresident corporation whose shareholders resident in the secondary
state are not permitted to exclude dividends received from the corporation-if the corporation
has standing to raise the issue-but the secondary state can reply as it would to the question
raised by the dividend deduction method of integration. See note 491 SUpra.
497. The primary state cannot provide a credit to the shareholders who are residents of the
secondary state because those shareholders are not subject to income taxation by the primary
state.

498. See notes 494-95 and accompanying text supra.
499. States generally do not tax dividends received by nonresident shareholders. See note
400 and accompanying text supra. Thus, the primary state resident would not be taxed by the
secondary state.
500. The word "exclusion" is misleading because there is no individual gross income from
which the dividend can be excluded.
501. The state that has no individual income tax will not encounter the partial dividend

F. Split Corporate Tax Rates and Repeal of the CorporateIncome
Tax

If a split rate method of integration is adopted at the federal
level or if the federal corporate income tax is repealed, the states will
encounter no problems in the context of the federal relationship
among the states. Both methods of integration affect only the corporate income tax. The only open issues are whether the state will adjust its corporate income tax in response to a split rate method at the
federal level, and whether the state will repeal its corporate income
tax 5°u in response to repeal of the federal corporate income tax.
VII.
A.

Maintenance of State Revenues and Administrative
Simplicity in A Federal System
Introduction

It is possible that various states may be satisfied with the immediate effects on state income taxation if the federal government
adopts income tax integration." 3 It is also possible that a state may
be content to adopt or reject integration. A state could decide that to
follow any of the three courses of action-no response, adoption of
integration, or rejection of integration-would be disastrous or extremely burdensome to the state . 50 Thus, the state might seek alternative courses of action. Some of the proposed alternative
arrangements are feasible only if many states agree to pursue them.
These arrangements are not mutually exclusive and assorted combinations of their features provide additional possible arrangements.
Finally, other arrangements exist that have not occurred to the author and which will be suggested only when other writers address
them.
B. FederalRevenue Adjustments
The federal revenue sharing mechanism provides a method of
offsetting revenue shifts that will occur as a consequence of the adopexclusion problem discussed in the text accompanying note 498 supra because its decision not
to tax any dividends already has been made.
502. See note 379 supra
503. This article speaks in terms of actions, decisions, and analyses by the state for reasons
of simplicity. More precisely, it is the legislature, Governor, and citizenry of a state that decide, act, and analyze.
504. A state should consider that if federal income tax integration is as successful as its
proponents predict it will be, the benefits to the national economy caused by federal income
tax integration should filter through to the states in the form of increased tax bases-such as
higher incomes, more transactions subject to sales taxes, and increases in property tax assessments,-without as great an increase in state expenditures. It is beyond the scope of this article
to measure that effect.

tion of income tax integration at the federal level.5" 5 Adjustments in
distribution formulas can be made to compensate states in which
revenues decline. The same purpose can be achieved outside of the
federal revenue sharing mechanism, but requires diversion of some
funds from revenue sharing to the other mechanism. Use of revenue
sharing, however, would avoid creation of another bureaucracy to
handle federal-state fiscal relations. The system used in West Germany to equalize the financial strengths of the states offers guidance
for the designers of a federal adjustment system. Modifications to
the West German equalization system would be necessary because
the fiscal relationships and allocations of tax jurisdiction among the
national and state governments in West Germany differ from those
in the United States. 5° 6
C

The Carter Commission Proposals

1 State WithdrawalFrom the CorporateIncome Tax.-When
the Carter Commission in Canada addressed itself to the problems
the provinces would encounter if income tax integration were
adopted at the federal level, it suggested that those problems could
be alleviated if the provinces repealed their corporate income taxes.
The Carter Commission suggested that the states could recoup their
revenue losses5 "7 in other ways, 08 but it is not clear that any of the
forty-six states with corporate income taxes would be willing to
abandon the corporate income tax base. Aside from the fact that
state revenues would be jeopardized, 509 this arrangement would
leave unresolved many of the problems concerning the individual
income tax that are raised by integration. Presumably, states would
also forego taxing dividends. Even though that arrangement would
solve many administrative problems, states probably would react in
opposition, as did the provinces of Canada.
2. Piggybacking.-Another arrangement proposed by the
Carter Commission to alleviate the problems that the provinces
would encounter is federal collection of income taxes on behalf of
the provinces. This piggybacking approach appears to solve most of
the administrative problems and revenue shifts caused by the adoption of integration at the federal level. Some states, however, have
505. No revenue shifts will occur if every state takes steps to reject income tax integration,
a highly unlikely possibility.
506. See notes 172-74 and accompanying text supra.
507. The revenue loss would be shifted to the federal level.
508. Royal Commission on Taxation, 6 Report 196 (Ottawa 1966).
509. Currently, the federal government does not administer any tax that produces as much
revenue as the state corporate income tax and that the federal government is willing to forego
in favor of the states.

constitutional limitations51 and problems in computing the share of
each state in the revenue collected by the federal government would
persist. If the piggybacking provisions in the Internal Revnue Code
were used, it would be necessary for each state to adopt integration
and the problems involving taxation of nonresident shareholders and
computing tax credits would remain.5 ' The prospects for this ar-

rangement seem dim, since the states have been reluctant to utilize
the existing piggybacking provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code.5 12
3. Federal Creditfor State Corporate Tax.-As a third arrangement for alleviating the problems the provinces would encounter if income tax integration were adopted at the federal level, the
Carter Commission suggested that the national government should
adopt a dividend credit method of integration that permits shareholders to claim a credit against their federal tax liabilities for a standard rate of state income taxes paid by the corporation on the
income from which dividends are paid. This arrangement permits
the states to reject integration and avoid the revenue shifts and administrative problems posed by integration, but does not allow them
to thwart federal efforts to decrease or eliminate the double taxation
of corporate income distributed as dividends. The drawback posed
by this arrangement is that it decreases federal revenues without affecting the state income taxes that account for double taxation of
corporate income at the state level. The federal government could
recoup the revenue by eliminating revenue sharing, but the benefits
of the revenue sharing redistribution would flow to corporate shareholders and not the public at large. States probably would hesitate
to approve such a step.
D.

Multistate Tax Compact Amendments

The Multistate Tax Compact provides an opportunity for states
to solve some of the problems that arise when income tax integration
is considered in the context of the federal relationship among the
states. At present, the Multistate Tax Compact is a model act that
has been adopted in whole or in part by at least thirty states to eliminate some of the problems involved with the taxation of the multistate taxpayer. The problems of the nonresident shareholder or
nonresident corporation reviewed in this article could be analyzed
and studied with the expectation that a solution could be reached by
a series of additional articles to the Compact. The possibility of
510.
511.
512.

See note 181 supra
See notes 369-502 and accompanying text supra
See NATA REPORT, supra note 231.

resorting to the Multistate Tax Compact to solve the problems of
reacting to income tax integration is doubtful. Most commentators
agree that the Multistate Tax Compact is not the best device for solving interstate problems. 513 Amendments to the Compact are almost
514
impossible because legislative action by each state is necessary.
Amendments to the Multistate Tax Compact deserve attention by
the states when integration is adopted at the federal level, but it is
unlikely that use of the Compact will be considered an adequate
arrangement.
E. ReciprocalAgreements
States may consider the reciprocal agreement to eliminate some
of the interstate complexities of income tax integration. Presently, a
number of states have entered into reciprocal agreements with one,
two, or even a dozen other states in an effort to simplify tax administration, both for the state and the taxpayer.5"5 Most of these agreements concern wages, salaries, and similar income earned by 51a6
resident of one of the states from sources within the second state.
Generally, the agreement permits one state to exempt certain nonresident wages from its income tax if the home state of those nonresidents exempts wages of residents of the first state from its income
tax. This arrangement eliminates withholding and tax credit
problems. It would be advantageous in many situations for states to
enter similar agreements with respect to dividends.
The reciprocal agreement approach has three drawbacks. First,
each state must enter a separate agreement with every other state.
This drawback, however, has not deterred states that have entered
into a number of agreements, albeit with neighboring states.51 7 Second, states standing to lose revenue by not taxing nonresident shareholders on their distributive shares or distributions of net income of
a resident corporation are not apt to welcome a reciprocal agreement
unless it is with a state having similar revenue loss expectations. Finally, the computation of exempt dividends under a reciprocal
agreement would be more complex than the computation of exempt
wages. Wage records are usually straightforward and if an employee
performs services in two states, the employer must keep separate
513.
(1974).
514.

See 0. OLDMAN & F. SCHOETTLE, STATE AND LOCAL TAXES AND FINANCE 663
Id

515. See, e.g., OHO REV. CODE ANN. § 5747.05(A)(3) (Page 1973).
516. Id See, eg., the Ohio Reciprocal Agreements with Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan,
Pennsylvania, and West Virginia, dated Jan. 12, 1972, Jan. 7, 1972, Jan. 13, 1972, Dec. 29,
1972, and Jan. 20, 1972, reproduced in 1 OHIo STATE TAX REP. (CCH) 15-215.40, 15-215.90.
517. This would occur if Ohio entered into five reciprocal agreements with neighboring
states. See note 516 supra.

records in any event. 518 At present, however, similar records concerning dividends and the sources of the income out of which they
are paid are not as readily available. In the absence of a reciprocal
agreement the complicated dividend records probably will be required nonetheless.
The reciprocal agreement deserves careful
51 9
consideration.
F

User Charges

A state that is concerned about the revenue loss caused by those
methods of income tax integration that eliminate or curtail the corporate income tax might explore possible increases in the use of user
charges. User charges are service fees charged by a state for providing services to an individual, corporation, or other entity. Since user
charges can be imposed on nonresidents, use of this approach resolves most of the problems concerning the effect of income tax integration on the source of income tax revenues that provide state
services.52°
G. Devices to Administer Taxation of NonresidentShareholders
The manner in which some of the states subject the nonresident
shareholders of Subchapter S corporations to income taxation suggests certain arrangements that the states might employ to combat
administrative difficulties posed by income tax integration. In Georgia 5 2 1 and Kansas, 522 a Subchapter S corporation is taxed on the portion of its income attributable to nonresident shareholders unless
those shareholders agree to pay income tax to the state on their dis5 24
523
tributive shares of the corporate income. In Idaho and Indiana,
nonresident shareholders are required to pay tax to Idaho or Indiana
518. An employer would have to keep separate records for purposes of state unemployment insurance tax and the payroll factor in the three-factor income tax apportionment
formula.
519. The reciprocal agreement would not be required for all methods of integration, but
would be most beneficial for full integration and the dividend credit method of integration.
520. See notes 342-48 and accompanying text supra A discussion of user charges is beyond the scope of this article, but the opportunity they present for solving some of the
problems caused by integration deserves mention. For excellent explanations and analyses of
user charges, see PUBLIC PRICES FOR PUBLIC PRODUCTS (S. Mushkin ed. 1972); Goetz, The
Revenue Potentialof User-RelatedChargesin State and Local Governments, in BROAD-BASED
TAXES: NEW Or1IONS AND SOURCES (R.A. Musgrave ed. 1973); Kafoglis, Local Services
Charges: Theory and Practice, in STATE AND LOCAL TAx PROBLEMS 164 (H.L. Johnson ed.
1969); Stockfish, Fees and Service ChargesAs a Source of City Revenues: A Care Study of Los
Angeles, 13 NAT'L TAX J. 97 (1960).

A device similar to the user charge is the special district. See Mitchell, The Use of Special
Districtsin Financingand FacilitatingUrban Growth, 5 URB. LAW. 185 (1973); Novak, A Model
SpecialAssessment Law, 1 Gov'T FINANCE 8 (1972).
521. GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3102(b)(ii) (Supp. 1977).
522. KAN. STAT. § 79-32,139 (1969).
523. IDAHo TAX REo. § 22(d)(2), IDAHO STATE TAX REP. (CCH) 13-076.
524. See Circular IT-18, 1 IND. STATE TAX REP. (CCH) 116-016.

on their distributive shares of the corporate net income. In Idaho,
however, if the nonresident shareholders do not pay the tax, the Subchapter S corporation is taxable on the income attributable to those
526 to
shareholders. 2 5 Indiana requires the Subchapter S corporation
withhold income tax on distributions that it makes to nonresident
shareholders. 2 The Indiana withholding provision resolves the administrative issue of compliance by nonresidents, but the problems
of computing the amount of corporate income for which the nonresident shareholder is liable52 8 remain unresolved. Interestingly, some
states-Iowa, 529 Missouri, 530 and Virginia 53 '-require nonresident
shareholders of Subchapter S corporations to pay income tax on
their distributive shares of the corporate net income and apparently
have no more difficulty with this tax administration than they do
with nonresident partners.53 2
VIII.

Conclusion

The adoption of income tax integration 5 33 at the federal level
will produce significant consequences for state income tax systems.
Revenue shifts and administrative difficulties are an inevitable result
whether a particular state ignores, adopts, or rejects the federal government's choice of a system of integration.5 34 A state may decide to
negate the effects of federal integration on the state tax system or,
alternatively, it may determine that the wiser option is to conform to
the federal scheme. Steps can be outlined and implemented to pursue either goal. Regardless of the path taken, difficulties will certainly arise since not all fifty states will react harmoniously. The
states have demonstrated, however, that they are able to cope with
tax law revision at the federal level.5 3 The adoption of integration
may be the supreme test of the states' flexibility, but the problems to
be faced are not insurmountable. A probing examination of the var525. IDAHO TAX REo. § 22(d)(3), IDAHO STAi TAX REP. (CCH) 13-076.
526. Indiana also imposes this requirement on other corporations that are exempt from
income tax because the corporate net income is included in the state taxable income of the
shareholders.
527. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-3-4-13 (Burns Code Ed. Supp. 1977).
528. See notes 369-502 and accompanying text supra.
529. IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.36(5) (1971).
530. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 143.181(5) (Vernon 1976).
531. VA. CODE § 58-151.013(f)0(3) (Supp. 1977).
532. A tax administrator in any of those states probably would point out that it is more

difficult to subject nonresidents than residents to compliance and enforcement. See McKessy,
supra note 7, at 378.
533. This particular conclusion does not apply to the split-rate method of integration.
534. These revenue shifts and administrative difficulties for the most part will not arise for
states that have no income taxes and states whose corporate and individual income tax systems
do not conform to the federal income tax base. See note 176 supra. On December 16, 1980,
only eleven states were in these categories. 41 STATE TAX REv. (CCH) No. 51, at 4-7 (December 16, 1980).
535. See notes 90-132, 521-32 and accompanying text supra.

ious responses and complex arrangements that are available will set
the groundwork for state legislators and tax administrators to develop and implement solutions when the time arrives.

APPENDIX I
Illustration (i)

a.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Average corporate tax rate exceeds
average individual tax rate

No
dividends

40%
dividends

Maximum
dividends

$1,000.00
40.00
960.00
460.80
499.20
-0-0-040.00

$1,000.00
40.00
960.00
460.80
499.20
199.68
199.68
4.99
44.99

$1,000.00
40.00
960.00
460.80
499.20
499.20
499.20
12.48
52.48

1,000.00
-01,000.00
25.00

1,000.00
-01,000.00
25.00

1,000.00
-01,000.00
25.00

15.00

19.99

27.48

Prior to full integration

Corporation income before taxes
State tax (4%)
Federal taxable income
Federal tax (48%)
Available for dividends
Dividends
Shareholder income
State tax (2 %)
Total state tax (lines 2 & 8)
b. Immediate effect of full integration

I.
2.
3.
4.

Corporate income before taxes
State and federal tax
Shareholder distributive share
State tax (2 %)
c.

Decrease in state tax revenue as immediate
effect of full integration (line a9 minus line
4)

Illustration (2)

I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Average individual tax exceeds
average corporate tax rate

a. Prior to full integration
Corporation income before taxes
State tax (2%)
Federal taxable income
Federal tax (48%)
Available for dividends
Dividends
Shareholder income
State tax (4%)
Total state tax (lines 2 & 8)

$1,000.00
20.00
980.00
470.40
509.60
-0-0-020.00

$1,000.00
20.00
980.00
470.40
509.60
203.84
203.84
8.15
28.15

$1,000.00
20.00
980.00
470.40
509.60
509.60
509.60
20.38
40.38

1,000.00
-01,000.00
40.00

1,000.00
-01,000.00
40.00

1,000.00
-01,000.00
40.00

20.00

11.85

b. Immediate effect of full integration
I.
2.
3.
4.

Corporation income before taxes
State and federal tax
Shareholder distributive share
State tax (4%)
c.

Increase (decrease) in state tax revenue as
immediate effect of full integration (line 4
minus line a9 or line a9 minus line 4)

(

.38)

APPENDIX II

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

a. Prior to dividend credit method of integration
Corporation income before taxes
State tax (4%)
Federal taxable income
Federal tax (48%)
Available for dividends
Dividends
Shareholder income
Shareholder income
Total state tax (lines 2 & 8)
b. Immediate effect of dividend credit method
of integration
Corporation income before taxes
State tax (4%)
Federal taxable income
Federal tax (48%)
Available for dividends
Dividends
Federal tax attributable to dividends
Shareholder income
State tax (2h%)
Total state tax (lines 2 & 9)
c. Increase in state tax revenue as immediate
effect of dividend credit method of integration (line blO minus line a)

No
dividends

40%
dividends

Maximum
dividends

$1,000.00
40.00
960.00
460.80
499.20
-0-0-040.00

$1,000.00
40.00
960.00
460.80
499.20
199.68
199.68
4.99
44.99

$1,000.00
40.00
960.00
460.80
499.20
499.20
499.20
12.48
52.48

1,000.00
40.00
960.00
460.80
499.20
-0-0-0-040.00

1,000.00
40.00
960.00
460.80
499.20
199.68
184.32
384.00
9.60
49.60

1,000.00
40.00
960.00
460.80
499.20
499.20
460.80
960.00
24.00
64.00

4.61

11.52

-0-

